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BRIEFS

CSSR-MEXICO YOUTH MEETING--The Second Czechoslovak-Mexican Youth week opened in Prague on 22 September. Participating are representatives from four principal progressive youth organizations in Mexico, who during their stay will also visit several locations in Slovakia. The Mexican delegates will be acquainted with activities of the Socialist Youth Union (SSM), activities of the SSM at secondary education schools and colleges, and activities and mission of the Prague-based headquarters of the International Union of Students. [Prague SVOBODNE SLOVO in Czech 23 Sep 81 p 3]

CSO: 2400/6

ROMANIA

PROBLEMS OF STANDARD OF LIVING, CONSUMPTION OF GOODS

Bucharest VIITORUL SOCIAL in Romanian May-Jun 81 pp 487-495

[Article by Dr Constantin Grigorescu: "The Way of Life and Consumption in Romania (Theoretical and Methodological Problems);" a text completed on the basis of a study carried out within the framework of the theme "The Population's Consumption of Non-Food Goods and Services," contained in the Institute of Socialist Economy's 1979 plan]

[Text] As an objective reality, the way of life refers to the overall group of conditions of the human community's existence, to man's needs and the manner in which these are satisfied and to the people's behavior in the sphere of social relations. As man's needs become more diversified and involve a broad field of action, life becomes richer in content and man can express fully his creative potentials.

The building of socialism in Romania has brought about the improvement of the well-being of all the people, the formation and development of a new way of life and the ever more fuller satisfaction of the people's material and spiritual needs.

The documents of the 12th Party Congress foresee raising all the facets of the socialist way of life to new levels. The objectives and goals contained in the Directives, as well as in the Program-Directive and, especially, in the Program-Directive for raising the standard of living in the 1981-1985 period and continuing to improve the quality of life, show that along with increasing material production and improving economic and social relations there will also be an improvement of the well-being of the people and the level of culture and civilization for all the people.

The socialist way of life evolves and is gradually being transformed into the communist way of life. For our country, an essential moment in this regard will be marked by the achievement during this decade, roughly speaking, of a multilaterally developed socialist society. As is known, keeping in mind the achievement of this strategic objective, the 12th Party Congress approved the decision to draw up a new Party Program by the year 2000 or 2010. Referring to this problem in his report presented at the Congress, comrade Nicolae Ceausescu stated that the new Program will have to deal with the ways and directions of continuing to consolidate a multilaterally developed socialist society and of "gradually moving to the fulfillment of communist principles for working and living in our country."¹

The ever stronger affirmation of the new way of life in Romania raises numerous problems for the social sciences, including the economic sciences. In this field, according to the guidelines given by comrade Nicolae Ceausescu to the social sciences, it seems necessary to further the original thinking of our party regarding the formation and development of the socialist way of life and to thoroughly study from a theoretical point of view those changes that are taking place in the people's way of life and that of the social classes and categories. The furthering of the studies regarding the socialist way of life is, similarly, of interest in combating the myth of the "capitalist consumer society" which allegedly would ensure the well-being of society, would eliminate the alienation of work and would change the "homo faber" worker into the "homo ludens" worker.

1. The Content and Area Encompassed by the Category Way of Life

Recently, specialized literature has demonstrated man's condition in society through a number of ideas: "way of life;" "quality of life;" "well-being;" "material and spiritual standard of living;" "life style" and so forth. With regards to the content and area encompassed by these ideas, there is no fully unanimous opinion, and discussions are still going on about them, especially in reference to the idea of "the quality of life." Regardless, however, of the opinions of the diverse specialists, the essential fact is that the diversification of the ideas regarding man's condition in society has, at the same time, meant a diversification of the thematic area of study. We are referring, for example, to the problem of the environment, as well as to those studies regarding social indicators. As has been pointed out, all the above-mentioned ideas refer to man's condition in society, a fact which causes the existence of certain similarities between them. At the same time, there are also differences between these ideas resulting both from the areas they cover and from their intrinsic content.

In order to avoid slipping into a sterile discussion, we feel it is necessary to deal with the content of the mentioned categories according to objective criteria. Principally this refers to: 1. the people's needs; 2. the conditions and factors available to the people in the process of satisfying needs; 3. the quality and capacity of the conditions and factors used by man to create an agreeable, pleasant life; and 4. the people's behavior.

As is known, man has on one hand a biological nature and on the other a social nature. As a social being, people have a multitude of needs grouped according to very different criteria. With regards to the objective of this study we must remember one of the groupings made by K. Marx, that is, physical, spiritual and social needs.²

Needs of a physical nature involve needs for food, clothing, shelter, air, water, sleep and so forth, and their satisfaction ensures the existence itself of man as a biological being.

Spiritual needs involve principally man's needs for communication, knowledge and beauty.

Social needs, like spiritual needs, stem from the essence of man as a social being who enters into diverse types of relations with his fellow man: family, work, community and so forth. Among other things, we have in mind these needs, such as the need for comradeship and friendship, the need for esteem and respect or the need to participate in the organization of social affairs.

Speaking of man's needs, it is appropriate to stress that these are indissolubly linked to the fact that by his nature man is a creative being and a being who works and organically feels the need for equality, and that man is developing as a powerful political and moral being.

The characterization of the manner in which man's needs are satisfied naturally requires the use of certain different categories. This is even more true with regards to the quantity and quality of the goods and services available in a society, as well as the social framework (traditional or legislated) in which different types of social relations are achieved, when they do not always correspond to man's needs. Thus, the idea having the most restricted area encompassed is the material and spiritual standard of living. This category covers the degree of satisfying the people's material and cultural needs, including the consumption of food and non-food goods and services, the meeting of requirements for living space, the degree of education and culture and the status of health.

Well-being is a notion that has a broader area of coverage. In addition to the problems that define the so-called material and spiritual standard of living, well-being refers to an equal degree to working conditions, to the length of the work week, to the organization and zoning of the country and to the environment within which man lives, as well as to the social framework for the workers' participation in the management of economic and social activities.

The category way of life covers the forms of activity and the people's behavior in the process of satisfying their needs and in interactions with the social and natural conditions of existence of society. We are referring to the people's activities in the sphere of production and, beyond this, during work hours and free time, and to man's behavior in the work group, in his family and in society. An essential role is played by the people's behavior as producers of material goods and services, as well as their behavior as consumers of material goods and services. Way of life is the category that reflects the unity between the objective and the subjective and between the conditions that society makes available to man and man's vital activities. Moral norms, ideological values and cultural values of society, social classes and individuals, as well as the hierarchy of these values, have an essential role in the formation and development of the way of life. According to the aggregate level through which people's activities and behavior in society are viewed, we can distinguish: the way of life of each individual taken separately, the way of life of the social classes and categories and the way of life of society overall.

Many years ago the founders of scientific socialism substantiated the category way of life and the dependency of this category upon the dominant social-economic conditions. In this sense, in their work "German Ideology" Marx and Engels pointed out that the means of production must not be viewed only as "the reproduction of the physical essence of individuals. It is to a greater degree a determining means of activities of these individuals, a certain means of expressing their lives and a certain way of life for them."³ The historic nature of the means of production and the social-economic conditions permit the way of life of individuals to have a historic nature and to bear the imprint of the nature of the social classes and groups to which they belong. Under this aspect, Marx and Engels fought those concepts saying that the way of life of individuals could not reflect changes and transformations along with changes in social-economic conditions. The theses of Marx and Engels have fully proven their validity. The affirmation of socialism in an ever greater number of countries has meant, at the same time, the affirmation and development of a new way of life.

Currently in the specialized literature in the socialist countries there are still discussions with regards to the content of the category way of life. These discussions especially deal with the fact whether the conditions of the existence of man are or are not an integral part of the content of the category way of life. Clearly, the problem also deals with the relationship between the standard of living and the way of life. In addition to the opinions that say the way of life expresses the behavior of man in interaction with his conditions of existence, there also are opinions that say that the way of life also includes man's conditions of existence, including those elements that define the people's standard of living. It is in itself understood that we cannot speak of man's behavior outside of his conditions of existence and outside of natural, technical, economic and social conditions, as well as outside of spiritual values. For example, one is the behavior of man in production when he is the owner and when he is the salaried employee. One significant influence on the behavior of the producer is the fact whether he works manually or uses mechanized equipment and whether throughout his entire life he works on one simple single operation or alternatively takes part in carrying out a number of operations. These relationships are clear but they do not lead us to consider the above-mentioned conditions of existence of man as a part of way of life. It would mean we would have to reduce the basic economic and social categories to the category way of life. Things appear more complicated, however, when we analyze the relationship between the standard of living and the way of life and the behavior of man in society.

A. P. Butenko maintains that the standard of living is a condition and a result of the way of life and not a constitutive part of the way of life.⁴ A different position is expressed by Maria Boiceva-Mihaleva who feels that only the level of consumption of material goods and services are conditions of the way of life, with the structure of the consumption being part of the way of life.⁵ Without a doubt, the thesis that says that the people's consumption is a condition and premise of the way of life is a just one. The achievement of a food consumption

according to physiological norms, for example, ensures a harmonious physical and intellectual development of man and contributes to the development of creative activities both in production and outside of production. On the other hand, the development of creative activities and the ever fuller satisfaction of the people's cognitive and esthetic needs contribute to the rationalization of consumption, the placement of this consumption on strictly scientific bases and to a certain volume and certain structure of food consumption.

Similar correlations can also result with regards to the level and structure of the consumption of non-food goods and services. And, what characterizes the way of life is not the people's consumption as such, but man's behavior regarding material goods, a behavior that determines a certain level and a certain structure of consumption. We are referring, for example, to the fact that in societies based on exploitation and inequality, especially in capitalism, the consumption of material goods is a symbol of wealth and a sign that shows success in life. This is the source of the cult regarding material goods and the alienation of man regarding the material world and the transformation of consumption from a means of development into a purpose for living. This also explains the waste of material goods, a waste denounced even by specialists who do not share the ideas of scientific socialism. A graphic example in this regard are the works of Philippe d'Iribarne, of which we will mention one that is significant by way of its title: "Le gaspillage et le desir," which appeared in 1975.

Quality of life is an idea that has been less developed. Some specialists place quality of life at the junction between the characteristics of material goods and services, on one hand, and the needs and desires of the people on the other hand. For B. de Jouvenal, for example, quality of life represents the totality of opportunities offered to the individual by society to manage his existence, to make its products available to him and to make its services available in order to organize his own individual existence according to his own needs and desires.⁶ A similar position is expressed by K. Baier, who understands quality of life to be the totality of natural and cultural threats and the variety, quantity and quality of goods and services available to all the members of a given society.⁷

Other specialists place quality of life at the junction between the properties of all of the conditions of the existence of the people, including social relations, and man's needs and requirements. Mihai Draganescu and Stelian Beldescu, for example, feel that "for man in society quality of life represents the totality of those elements that ensure his biological integrity (or biological life), to which we can add the degree of satisfying his demands of a social-economic nature and of fulfilling ethical and moral principles and exigencies, as well as the synergetic and concentrated action of the demands that the social arena place on man."⁸ The authors feel that the idea in itself can be viewed from two points of view, in relationship to the individual and in relationship with society. Under this last aspect, in the authors' view, quality of life depends upon: 1. the economic standard of living; 2. the ecological standard of living; 3. the variety of life and 4. the quality of human relationships.

A significant contribution to defining the category "quality of life" has been made by professor Ioan V. Totu. Totu stresses: "Quality of life synthesizes the organic interdependencies between the level and quality of all the conditions of social life and the degree of satisfying the needs (requirements) of the members of society and the essential qualitative characteristics of the existence, development and improvement of the individual personality and human community."⁹

Other specialists restrict the content of the category quality of life to the nature of human and social relations and to the capacity of these relations to satisfy the people's needs of a social nature. Thus, professor Vl. Trebici maintains that "the standard of living refers to material needs while the 'quality of life' deals especially with human and social relations."¹⁰ Sometimes directly and other times indirectly the specialized literature has dealt, as seen in the above-quoted reference, with the relationship between the category quality of life and the other categories which define man's condition in society. Professor Emilian Dobrescu, recognizing the problem of the quality of life, feels that this is included in the category dealing with social well-being defined in its broadest meaning.¹¹ A similar position is held by professor Vl. Trebici with the note that in his view quality of life also includes elements of human behavior, those elements that consider the way of life.

We note, at the same time, that for other Romanian specialists, like those quoted above, the sphere encompassing the category of quality of life is similar to that for way of life. Naturally, one could ask: the category quality of life has its own independent existence alongside of the other categories and, if so, what elements distinguish it, which elements characterize it? In our opinion, quality of life cannot be treated separately from the problem of man's needs, from the physical, spiritual and social needs and from the conditions and factors that ensure satisfying the mentioned needs. The problem of quality is not defined by the sphere or area of reference of the needs and conditions for achieving this quality, but by the degree in which the material and social conditions and factors available to the people correspond or not to the needs and aspirations of the members of society. Quality of life applies to an equal degree both for the problem that defines the material and spiritual standard of living, and, thus, social well-being, and for the problem of the way of life. Moreover, the idea of quality of life has appeared in the specialized literature in the developed capitalist countries precisely as a result of the deterioration of certain fundamental conditions of the existence of man in these countries. We are referring, first of all, to the pollution of the environment and to the formation of certain large human concentrations in a restricted amount of space, a fact which creates numerous problems of a social nature, as well as to the unilateral development which capitalist society places upon man. And, given the multilateral essence of man and the fact that this is defined not only by physical needs, but also spiritual and social needs, the improvement of the quality of life is ensured both by the satisfaction of each need and individual aspiration under the best

possible conditions and by the satisfaction of all human needs and aspirations in their overall aspects. Like the other categories that define man's condition in society, the category quality of life also has a dynamic, specific historical content and a class content. The history of mankind and the realities of the contemporary world offer sufficient examples.

As has been said, the content of the category quality of life is not fully elaborated and there continues to be different points of view about this. Despite all this, the elements to which we have referred offer us sufficient grounds so as not to share the opinions of those specialists who say that quality of life is a bourgeois alternative to the Marxist concept of "way of life."¹²

Romania has gone through significant stages in the formation of the socialist way of life and in the improvement of the quality of life.¹³ The Program-Directive for raising the standard of living during the 1981-1985 period and continuing to improve the quality of life, approved by the 12th Party Congress, is a new expression of the unity between economic development and the well-being of the people and of the indissoluble tie between the development of the socialist way of life and the improvement of the quality of life.

2. The Model of Consumption - A Component of the Socialist Way of life

The consideration of the elements that define consumption in the countries where socialism has been built reveals the formation of a model of consumption different from that in the capitalist countries. The theoretical bases and traits of this model were foreseen by Marxist socialism long before the division of the contemporary world into two systems and the affirmation of socialism on an international level. On one hand, Marx and Engels fought the ideas that stated that the future society, socialism, would be characterized by a "harsh" regulation of people's activities and by austerity, where people would strive "to work more in order to consume less."¹⁴ On the contrary, taking into consideration the elimination of capitalist property and exploitation, Marx pointed out that under socialism the consumption of producers would no longer be limited by the surplus product held by the capitalists, but it would broaden its limits to that volume which, on one hand, would be permitted by the existing social production forces and, on the other hand, would be required by the multilateral development of the members of society. At the same time, socialism based on the Marxian concept is alien to waste and luxury since, as Marx mentioned, "luxury is the opposite of that which is necessary from nature."¹⁵

Under socialism and through its nature, consumption is not an end unto itself, but a means for the multilateral development of all of the members of society. Moreover, this also defines the general, essential characteristic of socialist consumption. Consumption is designed to ensure the harmonious physical development

of man and to permit the satisfaction of the requirements and aspirations of each person. For its part, consumption is a powerful factor for economic and social progress. Through its decisive contribution to the harmonious physical development of man, to the maintenance of the people's health and to the formation of the workforce, essential premises are ensured for the growth of creative activities and the increase in the efficiency and rational use of the resources available to society.

Research into the problem of consumption in Romania took on a significant expansion after the 12th Party Congress. In this regard, it is appropriate to stress, first of all, the decisive contribution made by comrade Nicolae Ceausescu in the theoretical elaboration of the problem of increasing and improving the structure of the people's consumption. We are referring on a priority basis to the theses regarding the optimum relationship of investments-consumption and the organic unity between the improvement of the people's well-being and the development of the forces of production; to the optimum use of material production by branch and throughout the country through the prism of satisfying the people's needs; to the creation of the people's incomes, that is to the relationship between the maximum and minimum salary and to the relationship between those incomes stemming from work and those from the social consumption funds; to the placement of consumption on scientific bases which exclude waste and consumption for the sake of consumption; and, to the optimum combination of raising material well-being with developing those conditions for broadening the people's horizons for knowledge and full participation in social-political affairs.¹⁶

The stage that our country is currently passing through requires a new approach to the problem of the people's well-being and, within this framework, to the problem of consumption so that this will fulfill its fundamental functions under the best possible conditions: satisfying the people's needs, that is, contributing to the multilateral development of the human personality. The development of research into this subject would permit: a) a more rational use of existing means and a greater concordance between the possibilities of the economy right now and the people's demands; b) a more thorough scientific base for following the trends that develop in the people's consumption and c) the formulation of a long-term policy on consumption that will lead to a model of socialist consumption specific to our country. Any consumption model and, as a result, a socialist consumption model is defined principally by the level and structure of the consumption of material goods and services. In our view, the model is viewed both at the national level and at the level of the social classes and categories. The problem presented is one of ensuring a more profound understanding of the current models and the factors that determine them and of foreseeing future trends under the conditions of furthering the process of social homogenization. A series of economic and extraeconomic factors have an affect upon the formation of a consumption model, including factors of a psychological nature and an ideological nature. The

formulation of a long-term consumption policy requires, in our opinion, the furthering of research into: a) the people's needs under socialism; b) the general functions of consumption and c) the role of consumption both in the incomes stemming from work and in those from the social consumption funds.

Specialized works, including those from our country, contain numerous pertinent ideas regarding the people's needs. Needs have been defined, classifications have been made and ideas have been advanced regarding their measurement.¹⁷ Nonetheless, currently we do not have a unified theory on man's needs in the context of the socialist way of life. Clearly, this requires a thorough, inter- and pluridisciplined study. One particular problem regarding needs is that of creating a hierarchy of needs and the role that different needs have in the life of a person in socialist society. Long periods of existence in societies divided into classes have pointed out that for the moneyed classes the priority needs are needs of a material nature. For the owner classes, needs of a material nature are not confined to the physical, vital needs and to the satisfaction of physiological needs. Their needs become a purpose unto themselves, a means through which they determine social status and differentiate themselves from the other social classes and categories. For that reason, what characterizes the moneyed classes is luxury, waste and ostentatious consumption.¹⁸ In exchange, the needs for work, creativity and knowledge in general have an extremely weak intensity for the moneyed classes.¹⁹ Naturally, there can be individual, separate cases, but they do not render void the general characteristics of the moneyed classes.

Contemporary capitalism has raised these characteristics to a higher plane, while currently the competition in the capitalist markets is so powerful that the domination of material goods is nearly absolute. In order to achieve a need to use capital and certain profits that are as large as possible, new products are constantly created (sometimes without a practical use and even some that are damaging to the physical and psychological health of the people), and artificial needs are stimulated.²⁰ One could ask: What is the hierarchy of needs under socialism? As has been said, man through his essence feels the need for knowledge and culture and work and creativity, as well as the need for communication and society. The problem that arises is for society to offer an adequate framework so that these traits and potentials which exist in each person will be developed and truly provide a multilateral flourishing of the human personality. Otherwise, we arrive at the restriction of the creative forces, a multilateral development and even the phenomenon of dehumanization.²¹

Given the economic and political-ideological bases upon which socialism is founded (public property and dialectic and historical materialism), we can state on firm grounds that, in differing from those orders founded on exploitation, in the new society needs are structured (as possibilities for achievement) in a new hierarchy. They are developed and expressed in accordance with the essence of

man, of the total and complete man, not the partial and unilateral man. There are specialists who feel that in the new order cultural needs should have equal importance with those of a material nature. Even more, the ideas has been advanced that socialist society should be characterized, in opposition to the capitalist consumer society, as a society of culture and creativity. Being fully in agreement with this opinion, we stress that under socialism the thesis remains valid regarding the requirement to give priority satisfaction to those physical needs for food, water, air, clothing and shelter, those needs which, in specialized literature, we encounter under the name of natural or physiological needs. But, differing from capitalism and other orders based on exploitation which bring about an unequal or partial satisfaction of physical needs, socialism creates the possibilities for all people to have material living conditions that are appropriate and to permit the development and flourishing of the human personality. Within this framework, at least two aspects of a principal nature seem to us to be worthy of note: a) socialism is incompatible with luxury and waste and with ostentatious material consumption. This is the result of the fact that under socialism the exploiting classes are eliminated, that a social homogenization process takes place and that the sole criterion for evaluating man is work and his behavior in society and his contribution to economic and social progress; and b) the objective of socialist society is to provide all the members of society a rational, scientifically determined consumption of material goods and services, and not to limit consumption like in the societies divided into antagonistic classes, where these limits sometimes reach the level of survival needs.

In our reference to the problem of the people's needs under socialism, in a practical sense we also dealt with the problem of the functions of consumption. First of all, there is the fact that under socialism consumption is no longer the criterion for evaluating the status of a person. Second, we referred to the utilitarian function of consumption and to the satisfaction of the physical, scientifically estimated needs of the people.

Life shows that outside of the strictly utilitarian function of satisfying physical needs, consumption also has other functions, including that of satisfying certain needs of an esthetic and artistic nature. Most frequently this requirement appears in regards to clothing. Specialists point out, for example, that among the reasons for clothing an essential place is held by those of a practical, moral, social, communicational, psychological and esthetic nature. This is also the source of the requirement regarding the creation of a wardrobe that will satisfy both the useful demands of a practical nature and those of the other demands of the people. Within this framework of ideas, it is appropriate to also mention the fact that equality is a trait of man, that he tends to imitate, to be in step with others and, at the same time, to be different.²² The interaction between imitation and differentiation generates fashion as a social-objective phenomenon, with implications for the people's consumption and for determining the rational norms of consumption.

New problems are also raised by the fact that fashion has a periodic nature which presupposes that products are morally used up prior to reaching a point of complete physical use. As such, those products replaced are to be subjected to a recycling process. It is presumed that in the future the esthetic feeling will be developed and that the problems raised by the recycling of products will not be more reduced.

The requirement of taking into consideration the diverse functions that consumption has also appears in connection with other products - furniture and durable goods. Housing, however, raises special problems. More than half of one's life is lived within the framework of a housing unit and it must provide a framework and an environment that will satisfy the biological requirements for space and shelter, as well as the requirements for psychological space that is necessary for each individual.²³ Correspondingly, it is necessary for the housing unit to also satisfy requirements of an esthetic nature, a fact that will influence approved construction solutions.

In some works, there is talk about the function of avoiding consumption and it is left to be understood that this is characteristic of all social orders.²⁴ Among others, there is talk of using certain items or consuming certain products (drugs, alcohol) in order to allegedly eliminate certain tensions generated by hunger, insecurities, lack of affection and so forth. Not by chance, the consumption of drugs has become widespread in the capitalist countries. Under socialism, there is no room, however, for avoidance consumption to become a characteristic of consumption.

The achievement of the socialist consumption model is a complex and long-term problem. The complexity of creating the socialist consumption model stems from a number of circumstances:

- socialism has succeeded in countries which in the past, in the majority of them, were poorly economically developed, a fact which generates a contradiction between the real needs of the people and the objective possibilities for satisfying them. The solution of these contradictions is a dynamic process ensured by the rapid growth of the production forces under the conditions in which (precisely for stimulating the production forces of society) the principle of paying salaries according to the work done is applied. This is the source of the differences and inequalities in the incomes and consumption of the population. Although these differences and inequalities are continuously being reduced, they are a trait of the socialist consumption model. In Romania, for example, the 5.5 to 1 ratio between the maximum and minimum salaries will continue to exist for a long time in the future.²⁵ In the future of creating a communist society and of carrying out a distribution according to need, there will be a full equality for the population in the area of consumption;

- in the countries where socialism has succeeded, there continues to exist by virtue of inertia a series of practices and customs from the old social order, practices and customs which slow the process of creating the socialist consumption model. In some cases, there can be an appearance of contradictions, recrudescences and prestige consumption, especially in the ranks of those categories of the population having higher salaries. There continues to be, however, phenomena of alcoholism. Similarly, in the area of food consumption there are customs and practices which slow the achievement of a consumption based on scientific norms, including in the developed socialist countries which have an appropriate material base. Changing these practices requires a modification of the psychological position regarding food and the replacement of a quantitative concept with a qualitative one. Deficient culinary practices and customs also exist in Romania.²⁶

The creation of the socialist consumption model requires, on one hand, the careful study of the people's requirements and the confrontation of these with the recommendations of scientists and the values of socialism, and, on the other hand, the offering of material goods and services in such a volume and in such a structure that will correspond to the people's demands and the recommendations of the scientists and the values of socialism. Respect for these demands leads to a rational socialist consumption model.

The large outlines of this model stem from the combination of the forecasts for consumption on the basis of explorative methods and on the basis of normative methods. The use of both methods requires taking in calculation as many factors as possible that have an influence. In the case of the explorative methods, we have in mind such factors as: income, prices, urbanization, production and so forth. Projections can be made through unifactoral consumption functions, as well as through multifactoral consumption functions. Clearly, the cognitive value of the multifactoral functions is far superior to the unifactoral ones. The normative methods are based on the findings of specialists regarding the consumption of materials goods or services which will fully satisfy the socially determined needs of man. They analytically take into consideration the multiple functions that a product will fulfill: utilitarian, social-esthetic, psychological and so forth. By their nature, the normative forecasts for consumption are the product of certain interdisciplinary research projects which can involve physiologists, nutritionists, commodity specialists, economists, sociologists, psychologists and so forth. As a result, in recent times in some socialist countries, especially for the development of normative estimates, a new instrument is being developed for guiding socialist consumption - the rational consumption budget.²⁷ In Romania, beginnings in this regard have been made at the Institute of Planning and Forecasting.

Given the above-mentioned, especially the fact that in the real consumption of the people there are also elements that do not adhere to the socialist consumption model, the normative methods remain decisive in determining this model. Naturally,

the normative method excludes luxury, waste and ostentatious consumption, as well as avoidance consumption. As such, through its essence the socialist consumption model is a rational consumption. Rational consumption requires the full satisfaction of scientifically determined needs, a broad range of products of appropriate quality offered to the people and the individual decision of the consumer to buy one product or another in the quantity and of the quality that he considers necessary. Rational consumption, thus, has nothing in common with a strictly regulated, rationed consumption, with supplies marketed on the basis of coupons or cards. Naturally, under certain special moments situations can appear which require the temporary regulation of the consumption of certain products.

Recently, especially in connection with the aggravation of the energy and raw materials crisis, representatives of political and scientific circles in the developed capitalist countries have advanced the idea of achieving a rational consumption in the capitalist societies (including in the field of producing and consuming material goods and services for the public). Along this idea, Edmond Lisle, research director of the National Council of Scientific Research in France, speaks about the need to move from a consumer society to a society of economy.²⁸ Although the capitalist state can intervene in the regulation of the operation of certain economic sectors and in the use of resources, the bases of capitalist society continue to exist along with waste, luxury and flagrant inequalities in the living conditions of the people.²⁹

The creation of the socialist consumption model will be achieved gradually through economic and social policy measures. The programs regarding the growth of the standard of living, the five year plans and the annual plans for economic and social development are steps which contribute to the modernization of consumption in light of the rational socialist consumption model. The consumption levels outlined in the programs and five year and annual plans mentioned are considered by us to be optimum consumption levels capable of being achieved in the respective stages in accordance with the level of development of the forces of production and the dominant economic and social factors. In the process of creating the socialist consumption model a decisive role is played by the incomes stemming from work, with these being, as has been said, a powerful factor which stimulates the efficient use of material and labor resources. At the same time, an especially important role is played by the social consumption funds which reach the people in the form of money or in the form of services. The fact they are principally distributed according to "the criterion of need" and not according to "the criterion of work" contribute to a diminution of the differences in the incomes and consumption of the people. Through these funds, society contributes to the creation of equal chances for the development and formation of all citizens, regardless of the size of incomes stemming from the work of the families or the number of members making up the family.

Speaking about the creation of the socialist consumption model it is appropriate to stress the ever larger contribution that public food supply is to have in this regard, including public food supply in schools, factories and institutes. The public food supply units are to have the job of being in the vanguard of placing food consumption on scientific bases and of contributing to the elimination of deficiencies that exist in the food supply system. In this direction, that is, of creating a rational consumption, we can have the common use of certain facilities that satisfy important needs of the people (transportation, cultural-education service units, as well as sport and tourism units). This type of consumption which, normally, is called inappropriate for social consumption, can provide access for a larger part of the population to these services, under conditions of being economical.

The extension of satisfying certain essential needs of the people through the public food supply or through the common use of certain facilities is influenced, however, by the achievement of at least two parameters: a) the cost of this service must be less than in the case of achieving it within the family or through the use of individual resources, and b) the quality of the service must be better. Common transport, for example, must be achieved during a useful time of the day and under conditions of comfort, at lower prices.

The development of socialist consumption requires the use of value and educational key factors in structuring the behavior of consumers in the direction of the model designed. We especially have in mind the use of retail prices and credit as factors of indirect influence on the consumer. These factors can play a more active role in the promotion of the consumption of certain products and services that satisfy the natural needs of the people under better conditions and in the slowing of the consumption of other products and even in their substitution. Similarly, the means of mass communication can make a greater contribution to the education of the people in the spirit of the values at the base of the socialist way of life and socialist consumption. The efficiency of the education actions for consumers are helped, however, by the existence of an appropriate offering of goods and services.

FOOTNOTES

1. Nicolae Ceausescu, "Report to the 12th Congress of the Romanian Communist Party," Bucharest, Politica Publishing House, 1979, p 55.
2. Karl Marx, "Das Kapital," Vol I, Bucharest, Politica Publishing House, 1960, p 256.
3. Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels, "Works," Vol 3, Bucharest, Politica Publishing House, 1955, p 21.

4. A. P. Butenko, "The Socialist Way of Life. Problems and Opinions," Moscow, Nauka Publishing House, 1978 (in Russian).
5. A collective work, "The Building of a Developed Socialist Society Economy," Sofia, 1980 (in Bulgarian).
6. B. de Jouvenel, "Arcadie, ou l'art du mieux-etre," Paris, SEDEIS, Futuribles, New Publishing House, 1971, p 60 and later.
7. K. Bauer, "What Is Value? An Analysis of the Concept," in K. Baier and N. Rescher "Values and the Future," New York, the Free Press, 1971, pp 45-46.
8. M. Draganescu, S. Beldeanu, "The Quality of Life and Civilization," in the volume "Socialist Civilization and Its Values. Preliminary Theoretical Studies," Bucharest, Scientific and Encyclopedic Publishing House, 1975, pp 73-79.
9. Ioan V. Totu, "The Dynamics of Development and the Quality of Life Under Socialism (I)," REVISTA ECONOMICA, No 22, 30 May 1980, p 17.
10. Vl. Trebică, "The Quality of Life - The Finality of the Socialist Economy," in REVISTA ECONOMICA, No 38, 1975, p 16.
11. Emilian Dobrescu, "The Optimum of the Socialist Economy," Bucharest, Politica Publishing House, 1976, p 27.
12. "Voprosi filosofi," No 3, 1975, p 134.
13. Ioan V. Totu, "The Dynamics of Development and the Quality of Life Under Socialism (I, II, III, IV)," REVISTA ECONOMICA, Nos 22, 23, 24, 25, 1980.
14. K. Marx, F. Engels, "Works," Vol 18, Politica Publishing House, 1964, p 427.
15. K. Marx, "The Bases for Criticism of Political Economics," Vol 2, Bucharest, Politica Publishing House, 1974, p 21.
16. "The Economy of Socialist Romania in the Works of President Nicolae Ceausescu," Bucharest, Politica Publishing House, 1978, especially the chapter: "The Correlation Between Investments and Consumption; The Balancing of Economic and Social Criteria in the Zoning of the Country; Material Stimulation and Social Equality; The Humanism of Economic Growth Under Socialism."
17. Aurel Negucioiu, "The System of Economic Needs," in "Studia Universitatis Babes-Bolyai," Series Oeconomica, Cluj, 1969, p 35-44; Petre Panzaru, "Needs in the Perspective of Socialist and Communist Civilization (I and II)," in ERA SOCIALISTA, Nos 3 and 4, 1975; J. Galtung, et. al., "Measuring World Development (Ito)," in "World Indicators Program," No 2; John McHale, Magda Cordell McHale, "Basic Human Needs - A Framework for Action," New York, 1978.

18. From a historic point of view, Marx and Engels pointed out the bourgeois evolution towards ostentatious consumption. Broadly speaking, the problem of ostentatious consumption was dealt with by Thorstein Veblen in the work "The Theory of the Leisure Class," 1899.
19. M. Pagnol (a member of the French Academy) wrote the following about the behavior of the moneyed class compared to the intellectuals: "The rich ones are very generous with the intellectuals, they leave for them the joys of studying, the honor of work, the pleasure of carrying out duties, reserving for themselves only the second class pleasures - caviar and sausage, a Rolls Royce and central heating in the heart of the danger of a lack of activities" (V. Topaze, Paris, 1965, p 246).
20. Alvin Toffler, "Future Shock," Bucharest, Politica Publishing House, 1973; Robert L. Heilbroner and other, "In the Name of Profit" (in the Soviet magazine, SSA, Nos 7, 8 and 9 in 1974).
21. The facts point out that in extreme cases removing the individual from contact with his fellow man and from social relations that involve language, attention and affection can result in death and the loss of the individual as such. In this regard, there is significance in the experiment conducted by the German Emperor Frederick, 1194-1250, where he placed 18 newly-born children under excellent conditions of physical care, but conditions where they would not hear a single word from the persons with whom they came in contact. The idea was to learn which language they would speak when they grew up (Greek, Latin, Hebrew, Arabic or the language of their parents). The experiment could not be carried out to conclusion. From a lack of affection all 18 children died between their 9th and 18th month from birth (see, "Man in the Contemporary World," by academician St. Milcu, Bucharest, Scientific Publishing House, 1972, p 34).
22. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, "The Principles of the Philosophy of Right," Bucharest, Academy Publishing House, 1969, pp 226-227.
23. See "Man in the Contemporary World," by academician St. Milcu, Bucharest, Scientific Publishing House, 1972, p 34.
24. Philipp d'Triarne thus characterizes avoidance consumption: "When it is impossible to sufficiently reduce the causes of the general tensions of existence (fears, insecurities, lack of affection and so forth), the psychological state of balance may be sought somewhere beyond these tensions... All people more or less use this type of avoidance to compensate for the most diverse type of shortcomings. Man's desires are frequently placed upon certain substitutes or symbols which he cannot really obtain" (in REVUE D'ECONOMIE POLITIQUE, No 1, 1972, pp 38-39).

25. The work done by the Central Directorate of Statistics regarding the family budgets of workers and peasants offer a rich statistical material for evaluating the existing differences in the people's consumption.
26. Iulian Mincu, "The Structure of the Food Supply in Today's World. The Food Supply System and the Demands Imposed by the Science of Nutrition," in ERA SOCIALISTA, Nos 2, 12 and 24, 1976.
27. V. Rutgaizer, O. Saenko, "The Use of the Rational Consumption Budget in Planning the Standard of Living," PLANOVOE HOZEAISTVO, No 2, 1978, pp 55-66. In this study, it is pointed out that for the food portion the Academy of Medical Science of the USSR drew up, through the current time, a set of 150 rational consumption norms and felt that the set could be expanded to 400-450 items.
28. Edmond A. Lisle, "From a Society of Consumption to a Society of Economy," ANALYS ET PREVISION, No 4, April 1974, pp 387-413.
29. Patrice Grevet, "A New Quality of Life," ECONOMIE ET POLITIQUE, No 24 (297), April 1979, pp 76-80.

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CSO: 2700

ROMANIA

MEASURES TO STRENGTHEN DEFENSE CAPABILITIES EXAMINED

Bucharest VIITORUL SOCIAL in Romanian May-Jun 81 pp 516-519

[Article by Col Mihai Arsintescu and Lt Col Gheorghe Aradavolace covering a scientific session held in April 1981: "The Romanian Communist Party's Scientific Policy of Strengthening Our Socialist Country's Defense Capabilities"]

[Text] In honor of the 60th anniversary of the founding of the Romanian Communist Party, the Ministry of National Defense organized, together with the Academy of the Socialist Republic of Romania, the Academy of Social and Political Sciences and the Institute of Historical and Social-Political Studies of the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party, a session to hear reports and papers on the theme "The Romanian Communist Party's Scientific Policy of Strengthening Our Socialist Country's Defense Capabilities."

On behalf of comrade Nicolae Ceausescu, secretary general of the Romanian Communist Party, president of the Socialist Republic of Romania and supreme commander of the armed forces, comrade Ion Coman, a member of the Political Executive Committee and a secretary of the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party extended a warm greeting to the participants in this event.

The reports and papers presented in the plenum and the sections broadly and argumentatively depicted the role of the Romanian Communist Party in Romania's modern and contemporary history and its vast political and organization activities dedicated to carrying out the great goals of the revolution of social and national liberation for the democratic and social transformation of Romanian society and for the consolidation of the country's independence and sovereignty, as well as its scientific policy in the area of strengthening the country's defense capabilities and of creating and training a new type of army.

Within the framework of the problems discussed, an especially important place goes to the presentation regarding the decisive role played by comrade Nicolae Ceausescu in the substantiation and promotion of our party's and state's military policy and his constant concern for supplying and increasing the combat force of the army and for raising the level of training for the patriotic guards, the young people's training detachments and the other formations within the framework of the national defense system. At the same time, the reports revealed

the patriotic and political-moral significance of the army's participation in carrying out the country's programs for economic-social development, the indissoluble unity between the people and the army and the correlation of certain branches of science with strengthening our socialist country's defense capabilities.

The report, "The Romanian Communist Party - The Founder and Leader of Socialist Romania's Army," presented by Major General Dr Constantin Olteanu, the minister of national defense, covered the basic points of our party's activities in founding the people's army and the process of the democratic and, later, socialist transformation of the army during the years of the revolution and socialist construction. As in all other areas of the country's affairs, the development of socialist Romania's army experienced a turning point at the Ninth Party Congress. Because of the creative activities of our party and its secretary general, comrade Nicolae Ceausescu, we have a thoroughly substantiated concept regarding national defense and an original military doctrine comprising a body of principles, guidelines and options that ensure a unity of action in the area of the armed defense of the country and that are equally valid for all the elements and factors that determine the country's military power. The author showed the special importance of the party's leadership of the army and the fact that this is expressed and exercised at all levels.

"The Position of the Romanian Communist Party Regarding the Role of the Army in the Country's Social-Political Affairs and in the Struggle for the Country's Defense of Independence and Sovereignty (1921-1944)," presented in the paper by Major General Dr Ilie Ceausescu, was broadly argued with facts and proofs which graphically attest to the party's concern for attracting military personnel to the struggle of the popular masses for democratic rights and a better life and for educating the soldiers in the spirit of understanding and helping the aspirations of those who had been exploited, and for blocking the repressive actions of the ruling classes and developing and broadening the revolutionary battle front. Although the removal of the communist party from the ranks of the legal parties in the summer of 1924 made the carrying out of its work in the army very difficult, this activity was not interrupted. The author of the paper stressed the objective principles of the party work in the ranks of the army and the broad variety of forms and methods used for the purpose of carrying out this work, especially during the period of the growth of the danger of fascism and the fierce struggle against the military-fascist dictatorship and for the overthrow of the Antonescu regime and Romania's alliance with the anti-Hitlerist forces.

In the paper, "The Romanian Communist Party's Activities for the Creation of a New Type of Army. Socialist Romania's Army, a Significant Creation of the Revolution and the Process of Building a New Order" Major General Constantin Antip and Colonel Ion Mihalcea showed the originality of our party's concept

and, furthermore, the means of achieving it regarding the creation of a new type of army in the sense of ensuring a complete agreement between the missions and aspect of the military organism and the nature of the social order that is being built in our country. The process of democratizing the army, a process specific to the first stage of the revolution, was principally achieved through the political and ideological persuasion of military personnel, concomitantly with the gradual establishment of the Romanian Communist Party's control and authority over the army and, in the end, with the army being taken under the direct leadership of the party. The socialist stage of the revolution gave an adequate content to the revolutionary transformation of the army and considerably accelerated its rate.

In the paper "The Determining Role of Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu in the Substantiation and Application of Our Party's and State's Military Policy," Colonel General Vasile Milea outlined the defining characteristics of socialist Romania's current military policy and the fact that this policy, being an organic part of our party's and state's general policies, is naturally defined by the same values as the system to which it belongs: realism, a scientific nature, a lasting substantiation based upon the realities of domestic affairs and the conclusions resulting from the analysis of the evolution of the contemporary international situation, a receptivity and an adaptability to new requirements and a true reflection of the vital interests of our nation and the cause of detente, active collaboration between peoples and peace in the world. In all these defining characteristics, the paper pointed out, it is easy to distinguish the fundamental characteristics of the daring, profoundly revolutionary thought and actions of the secretary general of the Romanian Communist Party, comrade Nicolae Ceausescu, the inspired creator and active promoter of these constructive policies.

Lieutenant General Gheorghe Conoiu's paper, "The Indissoluble Unity Between the Army and the People - the Basic Source of Our Army's Strength and Its Ability to Defend the Country," pointed out the fact that the unity between the army and the people, an intrinsic component of the socialist unity of our nation founded on lasting economic, ideological, political, social, moral and organizational bases, a unity with strong and multiple roots in the long history of our country, represents a guarantee for strengthening the defensive power of the country and for ensuring its independence. In the concept of our party and its secretary general, comrade Nicolae Ceausescu, the fulfillment of all of the army's functions is conceived and directed to always be carried out in close cooperation with the people.

Dr Florin Constantiniu's paper was entitled "Romanian Historiography About the All People's War as a Means of Defending National Independence." In it he presented the defining characteristics of Romanian historiography regarding the all people's war and the development of this approach in the specialized

writings after the Ninth Party Congress, which also stimulated the theoretical and scientific investigations into this field of broad interest, and the concerns stimulated by the clear concepts of our party and state regarding the defense of the country by all the people and by the guidelines of socialist Romania's military policy.

In the paper "Profoundly Educational Values in the History of the Romanian People and Its Communist Party," Dr Nicolae Copoiu dealt with this group of values, impressive through their humanist dimensions, through the prism of the influences exercised on the political-moral make-up of the country's citizens. He argued the fact that the work of the secretary general of our party, comrade Nicolae Ceausescu, had projected a new picture not only of the present and the future, but also of the history of the party and the Romanian people, with the great values of history being defined and evaluated in a unified view in accordance with materialist-dialectic philosophy and the fundamental truths of the historical existence of our people.

Rear Admiral Ionif Pricop presented the report "The Army - An Active Factor in the Development of Young People's Social Awareness, A School of Revolutionary and Patriotic Education in the Spirit of Socialist Ethics and Equality." In this report, he showed our party's and comrade Nicolae Ceausescu's concept regarding the objectives and principal directions of action for the communist education of the young people who are trained under the battle flags of the army for the defense of the country.

The multiple interdependencies between mathematics and military science were outlined in the paper "Mathematics and Military Science," by academician Gheorghe Mihoc. He pointed out the fact that more than a few mathematical advances have found their effective application in the military field, which, for its part, gave mathematics diverse theoretical and practical problems. In this context, he presented the value and multiple possibilities opened by gaming theory, which has permitted the analysis of sequential conflictual situations using mathematical models.

In presenting the report "The Creation and the Development of the National Defense Industry - An Expression of the Constant Concern of the Romanian Communist Party and Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu for the Strengthening of the Country's Defense Capabilities," Lieutenant General Nicolae Popa and Colonel engineer Nicolae Barbat argued the fact that the progress made in the industrialization of the country and the growth of our economy's technical and technological potential also permitted the development of our own production of defense equipment, which represented, in our times, a requirement for the consolidation of national independence.

"Physics and Military Science" was the theme of the paper by academician Serban Titeica. In his paper, after he presented in summary several of the significant discoveries of physics with broad applicability in the construction of military equipment, he gave priority attention to the achievements of solid body physics which led to the construction of certain rapid and small-dimension processors and to the progress in the field of decimeter electromagnetic waves with applications for radar.

Major General Alexandru Petriceanu presented the report "The Patriotic Guards - An Important Component of the National Defense System of the Socialist Republic of Romania," referring to the objectives and tasks of the patriotic guards, according to the Directive of the Supreme Commander, during the current five year plan and to the principal means of action for the organizational consolidation of the patriotic guards staffs, for the training of cadre, for the raising of the patriotic guards' capacity to intervene and take action and for the improvement of their cooperation with military units and the other defense formations.

Captain Teodor Tufan's report was entitled "Formations for the Military Training of Young People - A Significant Potential Force of the National Defense System." In his report, Tufan stressed the major directions of action for fulfilling the role given to these formations within the framework of the national defense system through the continued improvement of the methodologies used in the process of training young people and the spread of the positive experiences accumulated both in the military training of young people and in their patriotic, moral and military education.

Professor Emanuel Sahini, in presenting his paper "The Contribution of Physical Chemistry to the Science of Materials," revealed the fact that within the framework of a broad interdisciplinary synthesis certain important fields of physical chemistry, as well as the physical chemistry of macromolecules and colloids, electrochemistry, radiochemistry and photochemistry, all have significant possibilities for applications in different areas of military activities.

Colonel General Marin Nicolescu, in presenting the paper entitled "The Patriotic and Political-Moral Significance of the Army's Participation in the Carrying Out of Programs for the Country's Economic-Social Development," reported our party's concept regarding the army's social functions. Within this framework, concomitantly with its training for the purpose of carrying out its basic missions, there also is the task of actively participating in the achievement of our party's and state's economic objectives, showing the multiple significance of the army's participation in production activities as the clearest expression of our army's patriotism during peacetime.

In the sections dedicated to the principal fields of concern - military art, military equipment, social sciences and economic-financial activities, the 43 reports and papers showed the directions of effort for bringing about the

requirements as outlined by our party and the supreme commander in the army regarding increasing the combat capacities in the commands and major units [mare unitate] and all activities for training young people for the purpose of defending the country.

In the closing speech at the end of the proceedings of the scientific session, the president of the Academy of Social and Political Sciences, university professor Dr Docent Mihnea Gheorghiu, noted the fact that through the reports and papers presented the participants had outlined the laborious activities of the Romanian Communist Party and its secretary general, comrade Nicolae Ceausescu, to strengthen the country's defense capabilities as an integral part of the work of building a new society and the especially rich value in the significance and theoretical and practical ideas and conclusions of the problems discussed. At the same time, it showed the fruitful and becoming traditional cooperation between the Ministry of National Defense and the most prestigious institutes of science and culture in our country, a cooperation which has proven fruitful in other areas as an expression of the active presence of the army in all the country's political, scientific and spiritual affairs.

The proceedings of the session, one of the events dedicated to the 60th anniversary of the founding of the Romanian Communist Party, constituted a vibrant expression of the unlimited feelings of love and recognition which the soldiers of the country and all the people have for our glorious party and its secretary general, the supreme commander of the armed forces, comrade Nicolae Ceausescu.

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VIEWS OF FOREIGN HISTORIANS ON UNION OF PRINCIPALITIES COMBATTED

Bucharest REVISTA DE ISTORIE in Romanian May 81 pp 853-880

[Article by Viorica Moisuc: "The Year 1918 in the History of the Romanians. View-points"]

[Text] The result, conforming with objective laws, of the social, economic and political evolution of the Romanian nation, a united national state whose establishment was concluded on 1 December 1918 included between its borders the entire Romanian nation. The union of the Romanian principalities of Moldavia and Muntenia in 1859, an act carried out by the popular masses and recognized as such by the big powers, was consolidated by eliminating Ottoman suzerainty and establishing full state independence in 1877-1878. As previously, this "fait accompli" was sanctioned at the international legal level. At the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th centuries, in eastern Europe, where the big Hapsburg and tsarist backward multinational empires kept a large number of nations and peoples under their domination, the national liberation struggle took on an unprecedented scope under the conditions of the sharpening inter-imperialist contradictions. The establishment of the independent national state had become an imperative of that historical stage. Lenin correctly noted that "very many Romanians and Serbians (in proportion to the total number of Romanians and Serbians) live outside the borders of "their" state and that generally "the construction of a state" in the national-bourgeois direction did not end in the Balkans."¹ The observation was just as valid for the Czechs and Slovaks, under Hapsburg domination, and for the Poles, divided between three empires; the Ottoman empire, dominating nations and peoples in Europe and Asia, had reached an advanced state of destruction and backwardness regarding their own people and the natural framework for their development, the national state; in the Hapsburg empire, the dominating Austrian and Hungarian classes, concerned with "how much" and "how" to exploit the land obtained through force and the peoples deprived of freedom more and more efficiently, were annihilating the creative capacity of their own nations, a capacity that could only be asserted in the framework of sovereign, national, independent states; aggravated up to its culmination in the years of World War I, the economic-political-national crisis in the Austro-Hungarian empire and the tsarist and Ottoman empires could no longer be held back by any kind of repressive, administrative military or other measures. The collapse of tsarism under the blows of the socialist revolution was followed by the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian empire. By the end of 1918, the Republic of Czechoslovakia, the Serbian-Croatian-Slovenian kingdom, and the Polish Republic were acts achieved.² With regard to us, on 1 December 1918, the 100,000 Romanians representing the will of "all Romanians from Transylvania and Banat" decreed the union of all the territories they inhabited with Romania, thus concluding the last stage in establishment of the

Romanian united national state.³ "The flow of historical events demonstrates most categorically that the union was not the effect of an accident, the product of a simple favorable circumstance or of understandings which occurred at the treaty table, but the result of the decisive struggle of the broadest masses of people, an act of profound national right, the achievement of a legal agreement between the objective reality and the people's inalienable rights, on one hand, and the national framework demanded stringently by these realities," stressed Comrade Nicolae Ceaușescu, secretary general of the Romanian Communist Party, continuing to state the undeniable truth that "the peace treaty later concluded only legitimized the existing state of affairs."⁴

The progressive forces of the time, the illuminated people with progressive views and keeping up with the big revolutionary changes unfolding rapidly, fully understood the phenomenon and showed their solidarity with the just struggle of the people for national liberation and expressed satisfaction with carrying out a just cause. On 3 November 1918, a manifesto signed, among others, by Ady Endre, Bela Bartok, Gyorgy Bolony, Zoltan Kodaly and Jeno Varga, stressed: "We have no claim on our sister nations. And we consider ourselves a renewed nation, a now liberated force, as well as those brothers happily rising to a fresh life on the ruins of the monarchy. We wake eased with the awareness that we no longer are being forced to be the pillars of oppression. Let us live next to each other in peace as free nations with other free nations."⁵ An act with broad significance for understanding the community of interests of the Romanians and the cohabiting nationalities on the matter of building the united Romanian national state is the unreerved solidarity with the 1918 union of Germans, Schwabians and Jews.⁶ For the more than 17 and on-half million inhabitants of the new Romania within its ethnic borders (of which 73 percent were Romanians), a new stage of development was beginning on the path of progress, a stage which was placing on the agenda the overcoming of the big lags at all levels, an inheritance left by the long period of exploitation, plunder and oppression committed by the big neighboring empires.

In a study entitled "History, Is It Art or Science?" contained in the valuable set of manuscripts of ASTRA Library in Sibiu, A. D. Xenopol stated: "For the person who feels that the main purpose of history is a nice presentation, regardless of whether that presentation reproduces the development of life or only a fairytale, for him history is an art; for the one entrusted that history must reproduce the truth about the course of human things, with all the difficulties to be overcome, regardless of whether his presentation is nice or not, for that person, of course, history is a science"⁷; the words of the great scholar remain very current, especially if we bear in mind the circulation of essays in specialized or mass literature, essays which construct the history of certain phenomena in conformity with previously established conclusions. There is a single truth in this literature: denial of objective historical truth, eluding or distorting the facts, formulating "appropriate" theses which rhyme with just as "appropriate" facts. Of course, the question is posed of whether such "fairytale," as Xenopol called them, deserve the attention of those historians who make history a science and of whether, on such a base, it is possible to have a real scientific polemic. Because what really could be the answer to this kind of question: The break-up of the Austro-Hungarian empire following the national liberation struggle of the oppressed nations "is a legend diametrically opposed to historical facts,"⁸ as if the year 1918 did not even exist in history? Also, what really could be the answer to the assertion that the alliance treaty concluded by Romania with the Entente powers in 1916, a treaty which completely subordinated Romania's participation in the war to a single goal--freeing the Romanian provinces subjugated

by Austro-Hungary and reuniting them with the country--is characterized as "criminal," "imperialist?"⁹ Does the thesis according to which Romania is "the product of the 1919 peace" really deserve an answer, simply tossing in the wastebasket all the history of a people who had buried in the earth where they had lived many generations of ancestors, when tribes of migrating populations rushed across these flourishing lands?

Undoubtedly, Nicolae Iorga was right when he said: "The person earnest in his right cannot have any kind of passion. He has passion when he is removed from the place which is not his due, from that place where he felt he was master through conquest and master through oppression. That person has passion."¹⁰ But this "passion" in the attempt to demonstrate that which cannot be demonstrated, that of denying implacable historical truths and of "creating" so-called truths from the peak of the pen, thus, making anti-history, really recalls the times when the Austro-Hungarian or tsarist offices "decreed" that the "national problem" did not exist in their empires, while the repressive measures applied to the oppressed peoples were intended to "resolve" that national liberation struggle which was so dangerous.

Romanian scholars, particularly those who carefully saw to the historical past of their people, deciphering their purposes and their aims, never did "science for science's sake"; the past, with all that was good or not so good in it, served the present, in its most intense moments, while everything was serving the future; and it was more than once, defending a present full of hopes, that the patriotic Romanian scholars spoke out for the truth, that truth which was mixed up with the very history of their people. On the basis of this truth, then, we shall try to bring to your attention the historical facts which prove that the year of 1918 for the Romanians was an objective law, the act of will and struggle of a nation of nearly 18 million people, a concrete and irreversible reality which the progressive international community helped and recognized as such; this moment--1918--which meant fulfillment of a national ideal for which difficult sacrifices of the entire Romanian nation were made does not permit any defilement or damages from anybody, no matter who it is; that is why, beyond any scientific polemic, beyond what may be called a "difference of opinion," in this case it is a question of the respect due historical truth and the historical evolution of a people who never were brought to their knees during their existence and who do not owe anything to anybody in the work they did themselves, who enjoyed the international solidarity of the progressive forces in various eras.

In an interesting study which proposes to analyze and explain the orientation of Hungarian historiography after 1918 under the new political-historical conditions, which were completely different from the previous ones, Ferenc Glatz points out that the attention of historical literature to a large extent was directed toward explaining the decomposition of the dualist monarchy and, as a result, of "historical Hungary," bringing out "historical" arguments, with the tendency really being "to write about the disintegration of the old state formation as a vital problem of the nation."¹¹ And the author, trying to explain this phenomenon, feels: "The Hungarian historian--making an abstraction of Marxist historical concept which, also due to its exclusion from Hungary then, could not play an important role--suffered terribly" due to the "Trianon shock."¹² The decisive influence of this "shock," in the author's opinion, explains the orientations of "non-Marxist" Hungarian historiography after 1920, that is, "the historical-geographic unity of Great Hungary " Ardeal considered as "the symbol of the independent Hungarian state," "the historical motivation" of rebuilding old Hungary (since "economic reasoning could be reversed, while ethnic arguments were only partially usable, since merely a small portion of the Hungarian residents were

living on the separated territories"); "the investigation of Ardeal's history was not restricted merely to the subject of the independent Hungarian state of the Hapsburgs, but was broadened up to the presentation of Ardeal as belonging organically to mother Hungary" ¹³ as Ferenc Glatz points out. The "national problem" in the old empire also held a primary spot in Hungarian historiography after World War I, that is, "the relationship between Hungarians and nationalities." In approaching this latter problem, an important category of study, as Ferenc Glatz finds, "attempted to show continually that the Hungarians can claim the role of political leader on the basis of the right of the one who came first."¹⁴ Another aspect of the "sui generis" method of approaching the national problem in the former monarchy also was the attempt to show, as Ferenc Glatz recalls, that "the Hungarians always lived together well with the other cohabiting peoples in the country, that is, that Hungarian national policy always took the nationalities into account,"¹⁵ in other words, the "nonexistence" of any real national problem in old Hungary.

Actually, with or without the "shock" caused not by Trianon or other peace treaties but by the national liberation revolutions of 1918, the ones who regretted the old states of affairs launched theories subordinate to a single goal for the ones who wanted to exploit them: revising the national-ethnic borders of the states established or completed in 1918, or obtaining a new territorial-political status in central Europe under the federative formula, clearly having Hungary as the center. For example, who does not recall what Paul Teleki, future president of the council, wrote when he maintained that Hungary with the "separated" regions "forms a geographic unit, it has borders and a clearly defined center and its parts are economically and harmoniously completed"¹⁶; later, fascist Admiral Horthy claimed that dismembering the Austro-Hungarian monarchy was "a madness today regretted by everybody."¹⁷ Horthy, who pushed the slogan "nem, nem soha!" (no, no, never), also maintained with the same conviction the error that "in Transylvania, the Romanians were only a minority" and that, through the action of its troops, Romania "annexed" this province at the end of December 1918.¹⁸ Who also does not recall the theory of the "Switzerland of the East" of Oskar Jaszi* who actually aimed at creating a confederation of states which were former "members" of the monarchy and adjacent states comprised of Austria, Hungary, Bohemia, Serbia, Croatia, Dalmatia, while Transylvania was offered a "cultural and living independence in conformity with the spirit of Renner's Austro-Marxism."¹⁹ The formula of "rebuilding" old Hungary, as we know, circulated throughout the interwar period in varying ways and with different motivations, among which, clearly, the one of the "impossibility" of the existence of a Hungary lacking Transylvania and the other territories which had belonged to the "Crown" of Saint Stephen was not missing and of the need for rebuilding this factor of "order and balance" in central Europe.

With what justification did Nicolae Iorga rise in 1933 against such aberrations which smacked of "historical science" when he wrote: "Because it was a question of economic life, I do not know what kind of historians of political economics or very political economists threw out the following argument in Budapest: Hungary must be rebuilt, since it was a model of an economic unit. First you ask yourself--which Hungary? The Hungary of Saint Stephen created by the pope for an incentive in the crusades?" "The apostolic kingdom," Iorga pointed out, "is neither territorial or national. It can be big or small. It was big when there were the crusades; there are no more crusades, it gathered nicely within the convenient enough borders which it has now and which it can fill everyday with the national feeling. However, the national feeling," the scholar stressed, "does not mean to seek a quarrel with the neighbor in order to take back what you yourself took from him at one time, but the positive, creative and honest national feeling is that which makes you arrange matters well in your own country."²⁰

Of course, it is natural that today, particularly after the demonstration made by the 60 years of recent history of the states which, after 1918, formed the subject of so many attacks more or less dissimulated by theories of the kinds mentioned, the truth of 1918 should appear in all its complexity, although, naturally, differing opinions exist with regard to certain phenomena, points, situations.

For example, in a general work on the history of central Europe in the 19th and 20th centuries which appeared relatively recently, G. Ranki and I. T. Berend stress that "the principle of nationalities proved to be incompatible with the dynastic feudal principle of the Hapsburgs."²¹ Using many arguments and statistical data, the authors show that at the beginning of our century, of the total of 50 million inhabitants of Austro-Hungary, the two nations whose dominating class held the power, formed only 44 percent, while the people under their rule, some gravitated toward union with their independent countries and others wished to establish their own, independent states.²² In the years of World War I, they continue to point out, the process developed and the states established were the result of its finalization.²³

The idea also is developed by Istvan Pinter in a recent article. "Even at the watershed of the century, Hungarian nationalism was an ideological form and basic policy which the interests of the big landowners and industrialists wore and the trends to achieve a Great Hungary, independent from Austria, within which they would oppress the nationalities which were living there. The classes in power in Hungary," the author points out, "understood their domination over the non-Hungarian peoples in the Carpathian basin as a mission, a historic task, and they denied other nationalities' right to national existence."²⁴ He also stresses another characteristic: "The idea of the thousands-year-old Hungarian state with a bourgeois content became an integral part of the idea that the Hungarians should have a leading role in southeastern Europe."²⁵

As we know, the idea of the "historic" mission did not belong just to the Austrian empire or to Hungarian imperialism. Analyzing this feature of the foreign policy of the tsarist empire, the Soviet historian A. A. Iordansky shows that Catherine II, flying the banner of "liberation of the oppressed Christians in the Balkan Peninsula from the Turkish yoke," fiercely confronted Maria Theresa for domination at the mouths of the Danube, Black Sea and the Balkans. In this confrontation, when Maria Theresa annexed northern portion of the independent principality of Moldavia (the future "Bucovina"), to the great dissatisfaction of the Russian peasantry, the latter tried without success to obtain the "move of the Romanian principalities to the rule of the Polish king, Stanislaw Poniatowski, the protege of Russia. Since, however, at the same time Poland was living its last days before being divided," A. A. Iordansky states, "Catherine's proposal simply meant moving the principalities to Russia."²⁶ The tsarist occupation of the Romanian principalities and the great material and political advantages which resulted from this situation for this empire once again convinced Catherine the Great of the importance which would have been held by "establishing a 'Greek-Eastern Empire' in the European part, which would include the Danube principalities, with Potemkin to be placed at the head of it."²⁷ Dwelling at length on the Austro-Russian-Turkish relations and the situation of the Romanian principalities "caught between two fires"²⁸ in the last quarter of the 18th century and beginning of the 19th century, the abovementioned Soviet historian stresses that the Romanian principalities of Moldavia and Muntenia were necessary to imperial Russia "as the base for future move forward toward Constantinople and Trintori and as the final point in the big water artery of the Danube."²⁹ As we know, Catherine II's old plan was again picked up in various formulas in Tilsit and Erfurt by her successor,

who also tried to get the other powers interested. Secret understandings between the cabinets in Vienna-Petersburg-Paris regarding the Romanian principalities, whose status of independence had been gravely violated by the tsarist military occupation in the period of the interminable tsarist-Ottoman wars, brought the Soviet historian K. K. Persky to feel that they (the secret understandings) "produced a powerful impression on the Romanians, who understood that both Austria and Russia wished not the liberation of the Romanians but merely increasing the possessions they held at their expense,"³⁰ while another Soviet historian, N.A. Mokhov, referring to the same confrontation of interests between Petersburg and Vienna, stressed realistically that "the fate of the principalities becomes a currency of exchange in the international diplomatic struggle."³¹ Actually, in June 1811, for example, N. P. Rumyantsev, the foreign minister of Tsar Alexander I, wrote to Gen M. I. Kutuzov, supreme commander of the occupation troops in the Romanian principality of Moldavia that "obtaining both principalities would place in our hands the opportunity of making a favorable exchange with Austria, ceding the Romanian Country for another region and even if such an exchange does not take place, then, having the opportunity to then propose Wallachia either as a transfer or as an exchange, we would keep permanently the greatest share in the political system of the Vienna cabinet."³² So this is how two principalities with status as independent states were treated as "currency of exchange" in the politics of the time's great empires. The deterioration of relations with Napoleon, however, caused Tsar Alexander to reduce his big political plans to what he felt was "achievable," that is, annexation of the principality of Moldavia up to the Siret and Danube where it flowed into the Black Sea, at the same time claiming from the Ottoman Port "financial damages" for "rejection" of the principality of Wallachia."³³ For the latter, Alexander had "to be satisfied with 'such little' compensation in the opinion of the Petersburg politicians," A. A. Yordansky pointed out, "only because at that time the relations between Alexander and Napoleon had become so complicated that war between Russia and France had become inevitable"³⁴; this matter, the Soviet historian stresses, returning to the idea of the "liberating mission" of the countries, "finally explained before the Romanian patriots the role of the Russian emperor and the true motives for the interest of 'the greatest Christian power' in the cause of liberating the oppressed peoples in the near east."³⁵ I should add that, with regard to the Romanians and their principalities, enjoying political, administrative, religious, economic and cultural independence, they weren't in a situation of being "liberated," not being "provinces" (pashaliks) of Turkey. So, as far as they were concerned, the big "Christian" empires could not in any way invoke the motive of liberating the Romanians from the Ottoman yoke."

During a later period, the idea of the "historic mission" also was expressed in other formulas, among which a distinct part was held by that of the "federative state," a formula which had in mind perpetuating the states of affairs in the big multinational empires under the cover of a new form. Along this line of idea, we stress the remarkable contribution of Gyula Merei, the Hungarian historian, to the analysis of the causes for the crisis of the Hapsburg empire. He felt that no type of plan for federalization of the Hapsburg empire could save it, with its break-up being an historical need."³⁶ Referring broadly to the various formulas for "federation" planned, beginning with the Wesselény-Garasanin plan and ending with the one advanced by Aurel Popovici in his work "The United States of Great Austria" at the beginning of the 20th century and of Oskar Jaszi during the war, Gyula Merei rejects the idea that survival of the Austro-Hungarian empire under those historical conditions would have been possible any longer, when all the oppressed nationalities wanted their own independent states, regardless of the degree of liberalization which a federative state could offer them.³⁷ In the same position, the authors of the monograph "Histoire de la Hongrie" published in Budapest several years ago evaluated the inevitable nature of the

break-up of the double monarchy, with the decisive element in this phenomenon being the struggle for national and political emancipation of the oppressed nationalities who were aspiring to establish their own states which were independent and sovereign. With regard to the peace treaty of Trianon, the authors rightfully feel that it "gave satisfaction to the just aspirations" of the nationalities of the former empire.³⁸

The problems of the break-up of the Austro-Hungarian empire under the action of the struggle of the oppressed nationalities is treated in a very interesting report presented at the Romanian-Czech colloquium in Bucharest in 1967 and by the well-known historian J. Macurek.³⁹ Referring to the political-historical context of the Hapsburg monarchy up to 1872, J. Macurek dwells on the phenomenon of the national liberation struggle at various points, showing the development of collaboration between the Czechs and Romanians for one and the same goal: national-political emancipation, reestablishment of the independent states of the Czechs and the Slovaks, the union of the Romanians and the territories inhabited by them which were under the rule of Austria and Hungary, with the mother country.

His compatriot, historian Zdenek Kutina, concerned with the states in central and southeastern Europe established or accomplished in 1918, stresses that "the inclusion of all Romanians and territories occupied by them in a single national state" was the goal sought by Romania when it entered the war in August 1916, while the state achieved through the will and struggle of the entire Romanian nation in 1918 was "a united national state"; thus, we see that the peace treaties of 1919-1920 in Romania's case as well as that of the other states in this geographic zone meant "an actual reality."⁴⁰

Against the same background of idea, Juliu Bardach, professor at the University of Warsaw, and Hubert Izdebski analyze report on the federative principle and the federal state in history, a report presented at the 15th international congress of history in Bucharest (August 1980), the flagrant inequality of treatment between the dominant nations on one hand and the dominated nations on the other, both within the framework of the Austro-Hungarian empire as well as the tsarist empire. These inequalities were more emphatic toward the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th centuries, with the national liberation struggle to establish sovereign and independent states becoming a definitive feature of the political-social situation in the big empires.⁴¹

The acute nature of the crisis in the dualist empire is brought out by Emil Neiderhauser, who stresses the emphasis of the "big contradictions between the oppressed nations and the dominant Austrian and Hungarian classes and between the dominating and oppressed nations" on the eve of World War I. As Neiderhauser points out, "It was natural for the Poles, Romanians, Serbs and Italians to travel the path of unification with their comrades in other states and to wish to part from the empire."⁴² So, the national-political emancipation in the framework of their own states for the oppressed nations of the double monarchy appears in the view of the historian mentioned as an objective historical phenomenon.

Of the multitude of problems belonging to the broad process of the decomposition of the Hapsburg empire, the British historian Kenneth Johnstone dwells on Romania's place in the history of Europe in the modern age, while he expressly analyzes the political-national regime of the Transylvanian and Bucovina Romanians in the context of the evolution of relations between Austria and Hungary on one hand and the relations between the Hapsburg empire and the tsarist empire on the other. This

historian feels that under these circumstances "the stage was set for the big dispute between Russia and Austria for the Balkan countries and what was considered to be the dying Ottoman Empire." This historian feels that due to their geographic placement, the Romanian principalities "were for Russia a natural corridor toward Turkey and the Balkans and, as such, a basic means for movement in the frequent Russian-Turkish wars."⁴³

In connection with all this, the Soviet historian N. A. Mokhov, to whose studies we have referred before, in analyzing the political-diplomatic circumstances under which the Austrian-Russian contradictions were aggravated in the Balkan zone and the Danube zone in the last quarter of the 18th century, points out that, after Maria Theresa annexes Bucovina, a severe policy is established in this province against the native population: "The Austrian government insistently colonizes Bucovina with Austrians, Poles and people of other nationalities. Teaching in the schools was in German everywhere,"⁴⁴ the abovementioned historian stresses.

Under the international conditions of deepening rivalries between the Hapsburg and tsarist empires for domination and influence in the southeastern zone of Europe, the situation of the Romanians under foreign rule worsened greatly. "The wild policy of Magyarization," British historian Kenneth Johnstone continues to point out, "being conducted by the Hungarian government throughout the half-century which followed" (after 1848) "dispelled any hope for a solution, besides that of total capitulation; the compromise of 1867 ended any dreams of an independent Romanian province under the imperial crown."⁴⁵

We also find similar judgments in a broad work devoted to the history of the Hapsburg empire following 1867 by the American historian Arthur J. May; analyzing the features of the domestic and foreign policy of the "empire of ruin," as Lloyd George called it, in the age of the momentum for national liberation struggle, A. J. May dwells on the Romanians' situation and states that the Transylvania problem without question dominated the evolution of relations between Austro-Hungary and Romania, an opinion in full agreement with reality.⁴⁶ The author presents the characteristic aspects of the tough policy of Magyarization of the nationalities as promoted by Count Coloman Tisza and continued by D. Bannfy and later by Count Apponyi and he stresses the steadfast opposition resistance of the oppressed nationalities, who made a common front in defending their rights; in this context, A. J. May formulates the appraisal that the Romanians conducted the most tenacious and effective struggle against denationalization, resorting to extremely varied and clever methods and being permanently supported by their compatriots in independent Romania. The final goal of their struggle, A. J. May shows, was the union of Romanians in a single state.⁴⁷

Again picking up the matter of the Romanians, Soviet historian N. A. Mokhov shows that "finding themselves under foreign encirclement, the people kept their language and customs and, although tsarism hindered national development, it continued; the development of the ethnic awareness also continued among the people."⁴⁸ Also, in a collection of studies published in the USSR 3 years ago and devoted to the national problem in the former empire, it is pointed out that "particularly after the 1848 revolution," a revolution for the suppression of which the tsarist armies had a main role in the three Romanian principalities, "the national oppression practiced by tsarism intensified."⁴⁹

The momentum of revolutionary liberation movements in the multinational empires, movements which involved broad masses of the oppressed peoples, demonstrated in many

actions, represents a broad range of problems to which the well-known French historian Pierre Renouvin directed his attention, analyzing predominantly the evolution of the political crisis on the eve of the outbreak of World War I; in this framework, P. Renouvin presents the status of the various nationalities subjugated by the big empires and he brings out the indisputable truth that, despite the harsh policy of oppression, these nationalities "did not lose the awareness of their individuality."⁵⁰

Renouvin feels that the break-up of these empires in favor of the independent national states was a natural requirement of the time, the accomplishing of which could not be halted by the forces concerned with preserving the old states of affairs. He concludes: "'Balkanization' of Danubian Europe, which the diplomats of the Entente powers long felt was an undesirable prospect, was an 'act accomplished before the offices even thought to intervene.'"⁵¹ So, the Danubian peoples decided their future by themselves, independent of the will and plans of the big powers (including the Entente), placing already consummated facts before the peace conference.

Similar conclusions about the way in which the principle of the nationalities took action as a catalyzer of the struggle for political emancipation of the oppressed nationalities in the big empires also are formulated by Herbert J. Muller, who shows that this phenomenon "was a vivid reality of international modern life, a result of a century of unrest,"⁵² while Hugo Hantsch feels that the national problem remained unsolved in Austro-Hungary, with the dualism of 1867 giving Austria and Hungary fictitious statuses as unified states.⁵³ Robert Kann also speaks of the fictitious nature of the status as unified states given Hungary and Austria which, in his opinion, compromised the federative idea which would have permitted a more liberal status for the numerous nationalities included between the borders of the empire.⁵⁴

Jacques Droz, in a work published immediately following World War II, states, as do the abovementioned historians, that particularly after 1867, a broad "revolution of the nationalities" takes place in the Hapsburg empire for national and political emancipation.⁵⁵ (Several years later, Jacques Droz changed his opinion maintaining that preservation of the Hapsburg empire would have been in the nationalities' interest.)⁵⁶

Peter Sugar also takes the same position, feeling that "the only solution" for solving the problem of the Romanians under foreign rule was their union with Romania.⁵⁷

The principle of the nationalities, as a basic element in establishing a new political order superior to what existed in Europe at the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th centuries, with its corollary--establishment of united, national, independent states and the nature of "fait accompli" at the point when the peace conference opened--represents truths recognized in their defining features in many of the older or newer studies. Among the historians concerned with these problems, H. W. V. Temperley, for example, stresses that the principle of the nationalities substituted old dynastic principles in the content of the peace treaties of Trianon and Saint Germain.⁵⁸ Also, Maurice Crouzet feels that the liberation of the subjugated peoples in central and southeastern Europe and the establishment of national independent united states put an end to the sharp conflict of a national nature within the former empires, while the borders of the new states in general lines conform with the national aspirations of the people.⁵⁹

Along the same line, Maxim Mourin finds that the union of Romanians in a single national state, achieved by them themselves, was a real reality which the Paris peace conference "was invited to sanction,"⁶⁰ while G. D. Spector, the well-known American

historian who was closely concerned with the activity of Romania's delegation to the peace conference, also feels that the territorial changes on the map of central and southeastern Europe were produced much before the opening of the peace conference, with its being able merely to ratify an already existing situation.⁶¹

C. Bratianu, Spector says, "much more experienced than any other of the four big ones," was perfectly aware that actually the conference could do nothing but accept the decisions already applied by the peoples in central Europe.⁶² In turn, R. Ristelhueber, stressing that in 1918 Romania "finally achieved its traditional aspirations, uniting all the Romanian lands as in the time of the reign of Mihai Viteazul,"⁶³ implicitly reaches the same relationship between "fait accompli" and the recording of it by the peace conference. Also, the American historian V. S. Mamatey, after he gives a broad explanation of how Romania--a united national state--and the other states in the same geographic zone came into existence, states, "The peace conference in this way was faced with an accomplished fact in eastern central Europe, which it neither wished nor could succeed in changing."⁶⁴ Concerned with the same problems, Robert Lee Wolf shows that the union of Romanians in a single state resulted from expression of the national will in Alba Iulia on 1 December 1918⁶⁵; so, the peace treaties, in his concept, play a secondary role at the level of establishing the united Romanian national state. Identical conclusions also are expressed by Gottold Rhode, who emphasizes that the will of the popular masses brought the act of the union of all Romanians in a single state,⁶⁶ while L. S. Stavrianos in turn explains that in Paris the peace conference could only recognize and strengthen the actual situation existing in central and southeastern Europe through its decisions.⁶⁷

Whereas in the great majority of its representative works, modern historiography evaluates the break-up of the big multinational empires and the establishment of independent, united, national states as inexorable phenomena of history, there also are authors who circulate contrary theses, often with particular insistence, theses which are not original at all and which perhaps take somewhat further those old viewpoints presented by Ferenc Glotz in the study quoted above.

For example, some theses circulated by various historians and which actually result from each other, inevitably lead to a single conclusion: the artificial nature of the states in central and southeastern Europe. Here are several of the links in the chain of distorting historical facts: "Self-determination appeared as an ideology at the point where, connected with some apparently democratic demands, it served both to dissimulate expansion as well as to combat the despotic and aggressive principle, that is, the 'Germanic' principle," maintains Maria Ormos.⁶⁸ Pointing out that national self-determination or the principle of the nationalities was supported by the big Entente powers as "ideological camouflage" following "the break-down of the separate peace tries of Austro-Hungary at the beginning of 1918,"⁶⁹ the author, in referring to the peace conference, feels that "the decisions in their favor (of the states in central and southeastern Europe--editor's note) were adopted without their contribution." Maria Ormos feels that the states in central and southeastern Europe, natural results of the political-economic-strategic interests of the big powers as well as the plans of France "intended to promote the economic recovery of the region (it is a question in 1918 of reconstruction of the entire Czechoslovak, Polish, Hungarian and Romanian economies)," the plan of the Danube confederation and so forth--all these "aimed at filling this vacuum resulting from the disappearance of the monarchy with a new unit which would have been created under France's leadership."⁷⁰ So, this is how we find out from the abovementioned author that the abolishment of national oppression of approximately 30 million people in central and southeastern Europe generated a "vacuum," while the establishment of independent, sovereign, united and national states led no more or no less to economic chaos. If we take Maria Ormos' judgment further, of course one may say that the abolishment of colonial

exploitation over the widespread territories in Africa and Asia and today's proclamation of more than one hundred independent states were not phenomena of historical progress but they caused a "vacuum," with the "resolution" probably being a formula which would bring back the previously exploited peoples into a so-called political-economic unit placed under the sponsorship of the former parent states. Resorting to this kind of judgment contradicts the living history of hundreds of millions of people and dozens of independent states.

The theory of "vacuum" caused by the break-up of the dualist monarchy and the liberation of millions of people from under foreign domination is also supported by Istvan Dioszegi in an article on the international situation on the eve of the Paris peace conference; for example, he asserts that "a vacuum was created in world politics and in the immediate vicinity of the conquered countries, toward which various forces were demonstrated uninterrupted," with these "forces," in his opinion, being the big conquering powers and the small states of central and southeastern Europe which "strived to fill the void created by the world war,"⁷¹ resulting from his demonstration that the main role in the break-up of the Hapsburg empire was played by the military defeat of the central powers in the war.

Returning to the problem discussed by Maria Ormos, we find that the failure of all France's attempts and rejection in the coming years by Romania, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia of other numerous actions initiated by the big powers with the idea of economic "reconstruction" of the central-southeastern European region would have resulted in maintaining the vacuum created in central Europe by the break-up of the dualist empire, and the author asks: "Why did the small states in central Europe make the French plan fail, the idea of unity of the region; why did they want to preserve this vacuum in central Europe?" And we find the answer to this in the following statement: "The fact that the policy of these countries was determined by the past explains the atavistic fear, the archaic picture of the enemy. This is a general phenomenon but it becomes a private phenomenon in central Europe due to the narrow politic outlook of the small nations and perhaps also due to the fact that the backward consciousness is connected too closely with defense of the recently achieved independence and by the nationalism brought on by this."⁷² Thus, making a total abstraction of the centuries of struggle for national and political liberation of the nations oppressed in the multinational empire, completely forgetting that the year 1918 existed when the subjugated nations chose the path they would take in the future by themselves, failing to take into consideration not even the simple chronology of the facts which establish that Romania, Czechoslovakia, the Serbian-Croatian-Slovenian kingdom and Poland existed as independent states by the end of 1918 and that the treaties of Saint-Germain and Trianon brought nothing new from this viewpoint, Maria Ormos sees a big political and economic vacuum in central and southeastern Europe following the break-up of the Hapsburg empire and she believes that only "recovery" of the economic unity of the zone could have brought "salvation." But what is very difficult to imagine for a historian today is the idea that the defense of national independence would be attributed to a "backward awareness"; commenting on the background for such a concept, we see that national independence is equal with chauvinist nationalism, with economic anarchy, with the refusal of any cooperation, while the melting of national independence and borders into an "economic unit" placed under the sponsorship of a certain power would equal historical progress. The lack of originality of Maria Ormos' assertions also is proven by the fact that the well-informed people of the 30's were rising decisively against the ones who were maintaining that the independence and sovereignty of the states would be "stumbling blocks" in the path of progress and peace." "To recommend under current conditions the abolishing of national independence as a remedy for eternal peace

not only recommending an inadmissible prescription but means throwing the world into chaos and anarchy if we were to proceed on such a road and to preach that the remedy for eternal peace is destruction of the national sentiment not only is an impossibility but is taking from man the most important support of his present individuality,"⁷³ Nicolae Titulescu said in the German Reichstag in May 1929. And he also emphasized another generally valid truth: "At that reason, today, international right seems to everyone in particular as a law of coordination, not subordination, while the position of each state separately, compared with the other states, is a position of independence, not dependence."⁷⁴

In close connection with the abovementioned theories and in the same view of treating the problems, the thesis of the "economic unity" of the old empire is also formulated, the empire "destroyed" by the Trianon peace treaty decisions. "The territories which formed an economic unit in the old days," Magda Adam maintains, "were separated from the political and legal viewpoint" into what the author calls "parts with a unilateral economic structure, competing among themselves and incapable of full independence."⁷⁵ So the states in central and southeastern Europe established through the national liberation struggle are, in the opinion of this historian, "parts" of an economic "whole" which had been the dualist monarchy. Oszkar Jaszi also supported this thesis in 1921, when he predicted the "break-up" of the new states due to the "impossibility to survive" following the destruction of "the economic-political" whole which had been the monarchy. "It is impossible to destroy one half of a complicated economic organism and for the other half not to be contaminated by death. Eastern and central Europe," O. Jaszi found, "are facing the total ruin of dissolution: production cannot proceed, unemployment is increasing each day, moral and state ties are falling apart."⁷⁶ This thesis contradicts objective, well-known facts. For example, we know that far from being an "economic unit," the Hapsburg monarchy presented the picture of big inequalities from one region to another with regard to economic development. Transylvania, for example, permanently remained in the situation as a supplier of raw materials and the market for sale of industrial goods. "We from Transylvania," wrote Gheorghe Barit in the middle of the last century, "are as poor as we should be wealthy, because we have a) a total lack of credit; b) a lack of commercial markets; c) almost total lack of scientific institutes for agriculture, industry and commerce; d) immeasurable tributes to the circumstances shown in the three points; e) the stronger and luxury of a large portion of the Hungarian aristocracy, while it will be of the bourgeoisie of all nationalities 20 years from now."⁷⁷ Transylvania's situation was aggravated together with the creation of dualism in 1867, when the province was integrated in the united customs system of the monarchy; the Austrian and Hungarian bourgeoisie kept Transylvania in a state of colonial dependence, placing here a large quantity of industrial products and obtaining their raw materials under advantageous conditions.⁷⁸

We also know that the process of creating the national economic complex for Romania, prepared centuries on end by the close economic and spiritual links between all the Romanian provinces, entered into a higher phase in 1859 and 1877-1878, sped up through the organic integration of Transylvania in 1918, as well as of the other provinces inhabited by Romanians who had been under foreign rule, into Romania's economy. The formation and development of the national economic complex was imposed as a legal objective law of the development of the national economy, one which was valid for all states. Under the new conditions, the international division of labor took place in the new dimensions, concerning both the various branches of the national economy as well as the geographic-administrative regions; new economic branches and units appear and develop, ones which are needed for the national economic complex. Magda

Adam's viewpoint according to which "the bourgeoisie of the newly established countries refuses the old economic and political ideas of collaboration, combatting the division of labor established within the monarchy," and ignores the economic bases for the "new ideas" which were incompatible with the anachronistic division of labor within the Hapsburg monarchy. The new states' renunciation of the "old economic and political ideas of collaboration" caused by the imperialist division of labor as well as organization of the national economic complex in conformity with the objective needs of the independent national state represent an act of historic progress also confirmed by today's development of a similar process in the countries liberated from under colonial domination.

A problem today returning to international discussion in connection with the socio-political-national changes in central and southeastern Europe in 1918 is that of world revolution, as we know, a thesis supported by many communist militants and theoreticians at that time. Recently, for example, L. Nagy Zsuzsa, referring to this question, feels that the program of the Hungarian revolution on abolishing the borders and establishing a world proletarian republic "was a concept with a broad outlook. It is expected that the sufferings caused by wars, social contradictions as well as the policy conducted by the victorious Entente should lead to the rapid revolutionization of Europe's peoples, during which the dictatorships of the proletariat takes place, which, in this framework, will ally itself on the basis of proletarian democracy and national bourgeois contradictions also will be solved fast."⁷⁹ Proceeding from the idea that "creation" of independent states in central and southeastern Europe--"national bourgeois states"--was a poor solution which "could only promise the beginning of a new period of violence," Dioszegi Istvan also feels that "the conquerors and the conquered should have kept in mind the current facing mankind caught by the future national conflicts and prospects for supranational, internationalist solutions."⁸⁰ With the same view but in a manner of extending the theoretical and practical problems of 1918-1919 to present history, Andres Firon feels that "neither at that moment did solution lie in mapping out borders, no matter how carefully this would have been done" and that "the political realism of 1918-1919," in his opinion, lies precisely in the fact that the Hungarian revolution of the councils came out against territorial integrity and against the borders. The abovementioned author feels himself capable of evaluating that "a closed policy within national limits," understanding by this the new national states' own independent policy, would, in the perspective of history, have proven to be a poor political formula which caused new conflicts. "A solution is needed and the whole world feels this," the author finds. But solution can only be brought by the socialist historical perspective for eastern Europe taken as a whole," Andres Firon asserts unequivocally.⁸¹ With regard to Janos Kende, he feels that the formula recommended by the Republic of Councils of Hungary, that is, a Soviet socialist republic of "peoples of the former monarchy, a formula through which the "Hungarian Communist Party separated from the policy of territorial integrity," "could have represented an appropriate counterweight to the imperialist plans of the Entente."⁸²

So here, revived after more than 60 years, are the theories whose erroneous essence was even revealed from the beginning by history and which is continually revealed by today's realities. To feel today that world revolution is the best solution to the big problems of 1918 as well as that its failures then "do not prove the correctness of the adversaries but rather, at most, the superiority of their force," to feel today that a "supranational republic" would be a possible organizational framework for developing human society mean not only to formula and support utopias, to pick up old theses again, ones which were outdated and refuted by history itself, but also

mean in particular failing to take into account the objective laws of economic-social-political development with regard to the nations' inalienable right to exist independently and to organize their lives within the independent national states, states whose preservation in time cannot be determined exactly, at least during the current stage of historical development.

In connection with the theses formulated by the abovementioned authors, several clarifications are required.

First, it is a question of a narrow and deformed understanding of the world revolutionary process. As we know, the great diversity of contradictions in modern society causes extremely diverse forces and components of the world revolutionary process which bring together in a single stream the revolutionary struggle against imperialism and capitalism, the national liberation struggle, the anticolonialist struggle and so forth. It includes all the phenomena and processes which cause structural changes in society life at the world level in favor of social progress, national liberation and democracy. To place an equal sign between the world revolutionary process--a highly complex phenomenon which takes on extremely varied forms--and the world socialist revolution proves a great narrowness of views; the opinion according to which the national liberation revolutions and democratic revolutions are not part of this process but only those which are of a totally anticapitalist nature lead to basic denial of historical progress, a direct result of the world revolutionary process in the multitude of its manifestations.⁸⁴ This way of viewing the revolution was characteristic of many of the socialist and communist militants and theoreticians in the years of revolutionary elan. For example, before the international socialist congress in London in 1896, where the resolution entitled "Political Actions of the Working Class" was adopted, which specified "direct and unequivocal recognition of the right for all nations to self-determination," Rosa Luxemburg had published the article "Neue Stromungen in der Polnischen Sozialistischen Bewegung in Deutschland und Osterreich," in which she criticized the leaders of the Polish Socialist Party for their position favoring creation of an independent Poland⁸⁵; in 1913-1914 under conditions of the upsurge of national liberation movements, the discussions on the problem of self-determination were picked up again on an even broader level, confronting the two main concepts: the Marxist one which came out for the nations' self-determination up to the separation of the multinational states and the establishment of national, independent states and the Austrian social democratic concept (Otto Bauer, Karl Renner) which rejected the idea of self-determination, opposing national-cultural independence. Even after the victory of the socialist revolution in Russia and adoption of the historic document on the right to self-determination up to the separation for all peoples held for cefully in the former empire of the tsars, positions and concepts going along the old line of Rosa Luxemburg, Otto Bauer and Karl Renner continued to be demonstrated in the national movement. Of course, we know how in the time of the Hungarian revolution of the councils the point had been reached which asserted that "nations do not exist, just classes"⁸⁶ or that "nationality was a type of grouping of second rank people," feeling that "national oppression is actually oppression of the proletariat"⁸⁷; from here the finding was reached that "in Soviet Hungary there is no national problem."⁸⁸ In the series of lectures held by the leader of the Hungarian revolution, Bela Kun, on changing the party program, the above theses are presented in a broad way; proceeding from the idea that "the entire right to self-determination is, from our viewpoint, an idle fiction, since we do not want the right to self-determination, we do not want separation, but we want the unity of the proletariat, regardless of nationality, without taking into consideration the national borders," Bela Kun formulates the goal of the Hungarian revolution; that is: "Unified kingdom of socialism achieved at the international level"⁸⁹ and he

states that "we must break with the policy of territorial integrity, since this is an insignificant problem" which is excluded by itself within the world revolution. Also, judging any phenomenon of that time through the prism of the concept mentioned, the Hungarian revolution refused to recognize the legitimacy of establishing independent national states as the result of a legal process, an irreversible one, which put into concrete form an objectively necessary historical stage of historical progress. For example, the documents of the time state that in central Europe "new militarist states have appeared like magic,"⁹⁰ while on 1 April 1919 NEPSZAVA declared: "We shall erase any color from the map. The world revolution will bring world peace"⁹¹; on 7 April, during a popular meeting in Kaposvar, assurances were given that "in several weeks, all of Europe will be in flames and proletarian dictatorship will govern everywhere."⁹²

In the years of World War I, when the national liberation struggle had taken on unprecedented scope, Lenin treated the problem of self-determination in the program of the socialist movement, analyzing it in correlation with the thesis of doing away with the frontiers and the so-called world republic. "We assert that to reject achievement of the nations' self-determination under the conditions of socialism would mean a betrayal of socialism," Lenin felt, showing that national oppression is "one of the forms of political oppression; that is, keeping a nation within the state borders of another nation through force."⁹³ Liberation of the oppressed nations involves, on one hand "full equality of rights" and, on the other, "freedom for political separation." Stressing that Marx' thesis remains valid for the socialists, the thesis on "recognition of the necessity of the state," Lenin criticizes those who "imagine either that the democratic state of socialism victorious will exist without borders (precisely as a 'complex of sensations,' without matter) or that the borders will be established 'exclusive' in accordance with the needs of production."⁹⁴ He rightfully felt that, under the conditions of the victory of the socialist revolution and achievement of the right of the peoples to self-determination, "the borders will be established democratically, that is, in accordance with the will and 'sympathies' of the population."⁹⁵

Second, the thesis on the "supranational" state (republic) obligatorily excludes the equality among nations and fuses political independence and sovereignty into a relationship of subordination. There is no more than one step from here until the formula of the "historic mission" of one nation or another. Also, Oscar Jaszi stated clearly, but in 1919-1921, that for a "new order" in central Europe under conditions of the break-up of the dualist empire, "the single condition is precisely true democracy, honest independence and a launching on the road of rational socialism with all the forces. In such an international order," he stated, "the Hungarians, unchained from the feudal and capitalist ties, would become one of the most productive factors, fuller of initiative and most enthusiastic in the Danube basin," while "the German nature, freed of the militarist and imperialist chains, will be the natural guider and consolidator of this new balance."⁹⁶ So, even in 1919-1921, simply and clearly expressed, is a formula for "supranational" republic, in which the participating peoples would be given independence, with "the natural guider" for such a state formation being the "German nature"; what is absurd is precisely the fact that the initiators of the formula found that only in this way could one reach a "true democracy," the so-called "rational socialism." However, what is certain is that neither in 1918 nor later were the nations disposed to accept perpetuation of the old situation of subordination and political-national-economic-cultural discrimination, they refused any "guidance" or "advice" from outside, regardless of who assumed this "historic mission," and they rejected any political formula with these kinds of obligations.

Third, in connection with the above, the problem of internationalism arises as approached by the abovementioned authors in a view which has proven to be bypassed by history, by the facts. If in 1919 it still was being maintained that the "internationalism of the worker movement, the international nature of the revolution is what should serve as the departure point in creating all the programs of the worker parties"⁹⁷ and, in this view, it was stressed that "the workers of various countries do not have different interests, they have a single interest—that of the international liberation of the revolutionary proletariat, a liberation which can only be the task of the world revolution. The program must start with this job," then time and the facts have shown that this kind of "internationalism" meant the existence of a single leading center, the use of single methods and means in working out the revolutionary tactics and strategy without taking into consideration the specific nature of the national socio-political-economic framework in which the parties of the working class were taking action. For example, this is how Bela Kun explained the matter in a lecture held on 15 May 1919: "The Third International differed from the Second International, particularly because the first is a united organization, whose unity is expressed not only by the principled and theoretical bases which are united but also its tactic also is a unified one, its method of struggle is unified and the party of each country separately must be considered, as, in their time, the first workers' parties headed by Marx and Engels were, as sections of a unified international organization." Criticizing the concept of the "national parties," Bela Kun believed that "all actions of the worker movement must be guided in a unified way because only a unified international action is capable of showing the proletariat the path to follow in order to escape from the chains of capitalism."⁹⁹ In this view, then, the proletariat should have acted under the guidance of a supranational forum, whose purpose was to work out a "unified" strategy and tactics which were obligatory for all the communist and worker parties and simple sections of this forum. Naturally, under such conditions, the concepts of national independence and sovereignty disappeared, while militant solidarity between the communist and worker parties, based on equality and mutual respect for the independence of action of the working class in each country and independence of each party in working out its own program of action according to local conditions and in determining the goals of its struggle to conform to the interests and aspirations of all the people, were replaced with relations of subordination to a foreign leading center.

The documents of the Romanian socialist movement in 1880-1890, proceeding from the postulate that "socialism is merely a well-known direction for social progress"¹⁰⁰ and demonstrating that socialism "is not an exotic plant" in Romania but appeared and developed naturally in Romanian society,¹⁰¹ considered it "indisputable that, from the viewpoint of tactics, Romanian socialism must have its own weapons, economic conditions and economic field on which it would have to work, being its own," while "with regard to the methods by which this goal is to be reached, each is to use what is required by the special conditions of his country."¹⁰² So, accepting the generally valid principles of socialism, the Romanian socialists saw their accomplishment in Romania only in relationship to the specific conditions and stage of development of Romanian society and the vital and major interests of the popular masses.

It is not useless to recall that a number of aspects of the narrow and defective way of understanding "internationalism" were subject for analysis for Engels, even at the end of the 19th century. For example, in a letter to Kautsky of 12 September 1882, in analyzing the liberation process in the colonies of Africa, America and other continents, a process which would be led to a good end by the domestic forces, Engels emphasized that "the victorious proletariat will not be able to make any foreign

people happy under compulsion without undermining its own victory through this, a thesis which Lenin took over in July 1916, commenting on it in this way: "Engels formulates a single principle as being 'undoubtedly' and indisputably internationalist and he applies it in the case of all foreign people that is, not only to the colonial peoples: to make them happy under compulsion means to undermine the victory of the proletariat."¹⁰³ With regard to the importance of the goal of national self-determination as an integral part of internationalism, Lenin formulated a number of truths which are perfectly valid today, but especially true in 1916-1919, when tens of millions of people were putting into practice the principle of self-determination in the central, southeast and east of Europe: "The center of gravity for the internationalist education of workers in the oppressor countries must unmistakably be the propagation and support of the freedom of the oppressed countries to separate. Without this, internationalism cannot exist."¹⁰⁴ Lenin gave such great importance to the self-determination of the oppressed nations and to establishment of independent national states that he characterized it as "an absolute requirement, even if the separation could have been possible and achievable only in one case in a thousand before the establishment of socialism."¹⁰⁵

Even from their assertion in the political life of our country, the Romanian socialists felt that the national liberation of all Romanians and their union with the country into a single independent state was a major problem of the struggle for socialism in Romania. This is how clearly this goal was expressed in 1892: "We want a great and powerful Romania, however a Romania which is free and comprised of citizens who are free economically and politically. This is our ideal with regard to the national question."¹⁰⁶ As the liberation struggle of the oppressed nations in the multinational empires was intensifying, parallel with sharpening of the regime of terror and denationalization under conditions of the deeper internal crisis in these empires, the national problem took on a greater and greater share of the revolutionary theory and practice of the Romanian socialists. At the same time, they felt that only national self-determination, finalized in establishment of independent national states, permitted a real and powerful internationalist solidarity of the proletariat headed by their own socialist (national) parties in the struggle against imperialism and for the victory of the principles of socialism. For example, stressing that the social democratic party in Romania was the only "democratic and national" party "in the most profound meaning of the word," the Declaration of 28 October 1918 came out "against any national subjugation. It supports the nations' rights to decide their own fate" and, at the same time, stated: "the social democratic party is an internationalist one. Only through the fraternal link of the proletariat in all countries, of all religions can work be made free and war eliminated,"¹⁰⁷ in other words, "internationalism was seen as a broad militant solidarity of the proletariat in all countries to fulfill the ideals of socialism and in no way as a cancelling out of the particular national features or independence of action of the socialist parties in each country. The Romanian socialists understood the existence of the perfect compatibility between the national and international in the struggle for socialism and communism. This idea is expressed in the documents of the socialist movement in Romania of these years in all its complexity. Thus, coming out unreservedly for the union of all Romanians in a single independent state, this being "a condition sine qua non for our future," the Romanian socialists felt that "a decentralized people can never develop their particular national features for the good of all mankind,"¹⁰⁸ a thesis whose significance needs no commentary. At the same time the evaluation--rather well disseminated in 1917-1918--was considered mistaken and "naive," according to which the union of Romanians under the rule of the great empires with the "Kingdom of Romania" actually would mean an abdication from the principles of socialism,

with the formula being taught being that of the world revolution and the Soviet republic without borders. "The kingdom in its origin cannot be accepted by socialism even in principle," it was stressed in a document of the Romanian Transylvanian socialists around the time of the union. But "thousands of arguments exist which claim the union of all Romanians" and only in a unified state, guiding the energies of the people at the national level, Romanian socialism which "has its own ideal," can immediately put it into practice when it has available the necessary force."¹⁰⁹

As we know, acting in the spirit of this concept, the Romanian socialists participated actively in implementing the great act of the Union of 1 December 1918 in Alba Iulia. Once again, the documents of the Social Democratic Party Congress of Transylvania and Banat, held in January 1919 in Sibiu, stressed: "The congress finds that the union of the Romanian people in a single independent state is an historic need, based on the right for all peoples to have a free state of mind and Romanian social democracy, when it followed implementation of this ideal of Romanians everywhere, in no way exceeded the principles established by the socialist international congress, which always recognized the right of each oppressed nation which was divided under many foreign rulers to struggle first for its own independence."¹¹⁰ The self-determination of the Romanian nation and its union into a single independent national state, together with the self-determination of other oppressed nations in the big multinational empires as was natural was considered not only a legal phenomenon but also a component part, a necessary stage in the struggle of the working class and the socialist parties for the triumph of the principles of socialism. "The socialist party of Romania," the Declaration of 13 February 1919 points out, "appeals to all the proletarian and socialist forces in Bessarabia, Bucovina and Transylvania for their unification, forming a single socialist bloc, a single proletarian party which will lead forward the struggle of the working class of the new Romania toward achievement of its socialist ideal of freedom from under the bourgeois-capitalist oppression. Today's new Romania must become the socialist Romania of tomorrow."¹¹¹

These ideas expressed in the program documents of the Romanian socialists in 1916-1919 were in agreement with the natural evolution of society and with the big changes which were being produced at the sociopolitical level in the period of the proletariat's assertion as the most revolutionary force in society, in the period when the national problem had become the most ardent problem in the multinational empires. The truths expressed by them were in keeping with the historical progress of society, just as denial of the principle of self-determination up to the separation of the oppressed nations and propagation of a borderless state--that "complex of sensations without matter," as Lenin called it--were the deliberate denial of certain striking realities.

As I asserted earlier, the various theses in circulation regarding the so-called economic and political unity of the former dualist empire and the "historical error" of destroying it, regarding the "world revolution" and the "borderless" state regarding subordination of the people's national liberation to carrying out the socialist "world revolution," and so forth, with their many political-ideological ramifications, are links in a single conclusion, that is, the states in central and southeastern Europe are artificial* creations of the Paris peace treaties of 1919-1920, a conclusion which results logically from the failure to recognize the legitimacy of the acts of national self-determination of 1918 and establishment of unified, sovereign and independent states. I shall dwell briefly in the following on some of the aspects of this question.

Proceeding from the idea that World War I in its totality was an imperialist war on the part of all the warring sides, the historian V. N. Vinogradov states unequivocally: "The nature of Romania's participation in World War I and its goals were determined

not by the Romanians of the "old kingdom" to unite as well as those from Transylvania but by the line of bourgeois-landowner oligarchy which wrapped the most bold and gross conquest in the national flag,"¹¹² and this "conquest" of territories, the author points out, "was directed toward the four cardinal points."¹¹³ And V. N. Vinogradov's conclusion is as follows: "In Versailles, Saint Germain, Trianon and Neuilly, the representatives of the Romanian government signed treaties with Germany, Austria, Hungary and Bulgaria at the victors' table, treaties which nearly doubled the state's territorial area."¹¹⁴ Other historians, who dwell on the "conquering intentions" of Romania with regard to Transylvania, Banat and Bucovina, treat the problem of establishment of the unified Romanian national state in the same view.¹¹⁵ Referring expressly to the Trianon peace treaty, Istvan Pinter considered it "an unjust, imperialist peace" and this was "because it made important concessions to the greed of the bourgeoisie which had come to power in the new neighboring national states."¹¹⁶ Historian Frank Zwitter, also selecting the thesis that the states in central and southeastern Europe were the result of the imperialist world war of 1914-1918, however, also makes as bizarre a "completion" as possible: "In general, however, the results of World War I, were yet another victory for the ahistorical ("unhistorische") peoples. Clearly, he feels that the Austrians and Hungarians are "historical" peoples."¹¹⁷ In turn, Maria Ormos, in another recent study, picking up the theses we already have referred to, gives the just national claims of the peoples hardly liberated from under the rule of the dualist monarchy the qualification of "nationalist imperialism" and he feels that in Paris, these small "imperialist" states succeeded in obtaining at least partially the satisfaction of their territorial claims "in the name of anti-Bolshevism and defense of democracy."¹¹⁸ Magda Adam, taking the same position, adds that the peace of Trianon "codified the claims based on economic and strategic interests of the bourgeoisie of the successor states which deviated from the national principle propagated in Paris," while the borders of Trianon, in the author's opinion, "became the source for grave contradictions between Hungary and the successor states."¹¹⁹ Istvan Dioszegi feels that with regard to Romania of 1918 one cannot admit the thesis to which "historiography and politics" resorted, that is, "reunification of Romanian territories"; Romania as well as the other neighboring states in the zone, he maintains, were the result of the "policy of force of the victors and of unchained nationalism." The conclusion he comes to is that "the system of bourgeois national states, after four years of bloodshed, could only promise the start to a new period of violence."¹²⁰

Although small in number, historians like the ones mentioned above maintain the historical and political absurdity which, far from being able to argue them scientifically, they place into circulation either with historical falsehoods or with philosophical-political speculations or with deliberate ignoring of certain all too well-known facts.

For example, the thesis on the "imperialist" nature of Romania's participation in World War I is a deliberate historical falsehood, because:

Romania declared war only on Austro-Hungary, from whom it was claiming its national territories--Transylvania, Bucovina, Banat, Maramures, Crisana, the territories inhabited by Romanians;

The strategic concept and military war plans of the Romanian army were completely subordinate to the political goal of the entry into the war; liberation of the Romanian territories ruled by Austria and Hungary; the same nature of participation in the war--liberation of the territories inhabited by Romanians--was even preserved when the offense was taken up again in November 1918;

The decision to liberate these territories was taken even in the summer of 1914 and not following "maneuvering between various groupings of the big imperialist powers," siding with the most powerful¹²¹; far from being a cabinet decision, this decision answered a desire of the entire nation, while the struggle to reunite the country was led by all the Romanian people on both sides of the Carpathians;

Romania's entrance into the struggle in August 1916 was made following ultimative pressures from Russia and France due to the precarious situation of the allied armies;

Romania's military defection and occupation of the greatest portion of the national territory by the armies of the central powers were due to the failure of France, Russia and England to respect the commitments made through the treaties with Romania in the summer of 1916; it would be interesting to know how the tsarist army "saved Romania from being crushed during those days."¹²² Lenin, for example, referring precisely to "those days" at the end of 1916 and start of 1917 when the tsar and the Germanophile party around him were heading for a separate peace with Germany, wrote about the reasoning behind this kind of separate peace from the viewpoint of the interests of tsarist imperialism: "If 'we' run after too big a spoils in Europe, we risk completely exhausting 'our' military resources and not get almost anything in Europe and lose the opportunity to get what is 'ours' in Asia--that is how tsarism reasons and it reasons correctly from the viewpoint of imperialist interests." "If we have no way of taking more in Europe, even after the rally of Romania and Greece (from whom 'we' took what we could), at least let us take what we can! England cannot give 'us' anything now. Germany would give us back Kurlanda and part of Poland, and, undoubtedly, eastern Galicia."¹²³ And, referring directly to Romania's place in the relations between the two kingdoms, Lenin felt it was justified to assert that they would divide Romania, Galicia and Armenia between them: "One cannot know if such a conversation took place or not," Lenin wrote on 31 January 1917. It is important that matters evolve precisely in this direction. If the tsar did not remain convinced of the arguments of the German diplomats, in exchange the 'arguments' of Mackensen's army in Romania should have had a more convincing effect. Regarding the plan to divide Romania between Russia and the 'quadruple alliance' (that is, the allies of Germany, Austria and Bulgaria), there is direct talk of this "in the German imperialist press."¹²⁴

In V. N. Vinogradov's opinion, Romania's "salvation" from destruction lay in these imperial plans to divide Romania, about which Lenin spoke and toward which innumerable facts from "those days" converge. I feel that it still has not been stressed enough that the salvation then was the job of the Romanian people themselves, the heroism of millions of people, known and unknown, of political firmness and diplomatic ability. As many other times in their history, the Romanians saved the existence of their state and took action through all means to free their country.

The thesis according to which Romania--a unified national and independent state--was a creation of the 1919-1920 peace treaties and that it was comprised of "foreign" territories obtained through military conquest also is an historical falsehood, because:

Self-determination up to the separation from the old state formations and union with the country of the provinces inhabited by Romania was carried out in 1918 by plebiscite acts representing the will and decision of the Romanian nation; these decisions for union were merely ratified by the Romanian government;

The decisions for union with the country expressly specified the ethnic borders of reunited Romania; these borders in general lines were maintained and confirmed through the peace treaties.

So it is clear that the decisions made by 17 million people to live in a single independent country, decisions sanctioned by the country's legal government and recognized by the international peace conference in Paris have nothing in common with the acts of force, imperialism and annexation, but are precisely counter to them.

Finally, the thesis according to which establishment of the states in central and southeastern Europe meant the victory of the "ahistorical" peoples, in our opinion, is much more than an historical falsehood; here we are facing a total ignorance of history itself. By what criteria can peoples be divided into "historical" and "ahistorical?" The strict meaning of the term would determine peoples "with" history and peoples "without" history, which becomes absurd; the Romanians, for example, are the most ancient people in the places where, just a thousand years ago, the Hungarian tribes led by Arpad settled, a fact stated in all the encyclopedias. The supporter of the formula mentioned, however, has something else in mind, that is, that which improperly is called "historical" in the sense that the territories which the "ahistorical" peoples established for their own states in 1918 belonged to old "historical" Hungary and just as "historical" Austria through "historical tradition." In place of any other commentary, we shall print a portion of a speech entitled "Order in Thought," delivered by Nicolae Titulescu in Bratislava in June 1937: "Finally, what is this so-called historical right? It is a theft sanctioned by time." I would just add that the "historical right," a concept circulated a lot in the two decades between the first and second world wars had a multitude of derivatives as "historic mission," civilizing mission," going right up to the theory of superior races and inferior races with all the cortege of political-social implications; on another level, we know very well the concepts of an arbitrary division of states into states with "general interests" and states with "limited interests," the security of the big powers and of the small powers and so forth, with all these being in open conflict with the principles of international right, with democratic rights and freedoms. Revitalization of the theory of "historic right" in the era of the unprecedented wave of people's liberation on all continents, of assertion of small and medium-sized states in international life, with the majority having obtained independence recently, no longer are a matter of "speciality." This theory purely and simply is inadmissible, a residue of times which history for good.

The question is correctly posed of who is served today by cultivating the nostalgia of the centuries of Austro-Hungarian imperial domination over other peoples. Reality shows that precisely under the conditions of freedom and equality for peoples of the world—including for those in southeastern Europe—can progress along the path of civilization, well-being, while international solidarity—with its required attribute of respect for the individuality of each people and of their independence and sovereignty—is translated not only in the mutual aid in the struggle for progress and peace, but represents a broad base for multilateral cooperation among the progressive forces all over the world.

FOOTNOTES

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2. For all this see "Assertion of Unified Independent National States From Central and Southeastern Europe (18291-1923)", Publishers of the Academy of the SRR, Bucharest, 1979.

3. See Ion Popescu-Puturi, Augustin Deac, "The Union of Transylvania With Romania, 1 December 1918," Political Publishers, Bucharest, 1970; M. Musat and I. Ardeleanu, "The Great Union of 1918 and Its Confirmation at the International Level" in "Romania's Independence," Publishers of the Academy of the SRR, Bucharest, 1977, pp 385-412; Stefan Pascu, C. GH. Marinescu, "International Echo of the Romanians' Struggle for National Unity," Dacia Publishers, Cluj-Napoca, 1980; Stefan Pascu, "The Grand National Assembly of Alba Iulia, Crowning of the Idea, Trends and Struggle of the Romanian People for Unity," Cluj 1968; N. Fortino, I. Calafeteanu, "On the International Consecration of the Grand Union" in REVUE ROUMAINE D'HISTOIRE No 4/1978; Viorica Moisuc, "The Treaty of Trianon--International Consecration of the Legitimacy of Transylvania's Union With Romania" in ANALE DE ISTORIE XXII, No 3/1976 and so forth.
4. Nicolae Ceausescu, "Romania on the Road To Building the Multilaterally Developed Socialist Society," Vol 17, Political Publishers, Bucharest 1979, p 275.
5. "Assertion of Unified Independent National States From Central and Southeastern Europe 1821-1923," p 37.
6. Ibidem, p 39.
7. ASTRA Library, Sibiu, Manuscript Collection, folio XXI/12.
8. Maria Ormos, "L'Europe Centrale de Saint Germain et de Trianon: Cooperation ou Nationalisme," a report presented at the international colloquium on the subject "L'Europe de Versailles 1919-1923," Geneva, September 1979.
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10. N. Iorga, "The Historic Purpose of the Union," a speech held for the Cultural League at the Dalles Foundation, Valenii de Munte, Datina Romaneasca printers, 1933, p 9.
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12. Ibidem.
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14. Ibidem.
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- * The well-known Hungarian sociologist and director of HUSZADIK SZAZAD (20th Century), Oszkar Jaszi, received into the Karolyi government the leadership of the ministry of nationalities. Hope was placed in Jaszi that he would be able to preserve in the same "Hungarian country" the foreign nationalities, assuring exclusive right of the Hungarians over such a type of motley state. Oskar Jaszi's lack of perspicacity on this problem and his insistence on the impossible action he was undertaking appear all the more lacking in sense when, in the period in which he had begun application of the renowned Apponyi law, Jaszi had made a "sociological" survey in Transylvania and had become convinced of the Romanian realities. "Despite his vast culture and his progressive ideas, Jaszi could never rise above the narrow outlook of the 'thousands-year-old, national, unified Hungary,'" one of the brilliant representatives of the generation of the Great Union, Onisifor Ghibu, felt. The nationalities, although they formed more than 50 percent of the country's population, had to be satisfied with the situation provided them by the rulers; they had to be 'patriots' in the meaning decided by those who a thousand years before had conquered the land of the country by the sword," (see Onisifor Ghibu, "At the Barricades of Life. My Years of Teaching," Dacia Publishers, Cluj-Napoca, 1981, p 200.
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 21. Ivan T. Berend--Gyorgy Ranki, "East Central Europe in the 19th and 20th Centuries," Akademiai Kiado, Budapest, 1977, p 11.
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 32. Vneshnyaya Politika Rosii XIX i Nachalo XX Veka. Dokumenti Rossiyskovo Ministerstva Inostrannikh Del," Series I, Moscow, 1962-1967, Volume VI, p129.

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107. "Documents From the History of the Worker Movement in Romania (1916-1921)," Political Publishers, Bucharest, 1960, Document No 41, pp 105-106.
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110. Ibidem.
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- * Even today's realities, the establishment of dozens and dozens of independent states under our eyes, a process taking place on all continents, are felt by some theoreticians to be "artificial," created "in a "forced" way. For example, in this regard, see Roger Paret, Jacques Vernant, "Tradition, Identite Nationale et Developpement" in POLITIQUE ETRANGERE No 6/1973, pp 663-664 and Marcel Merle, "Sociologie des Relations Internationales," Dallos, Paris, 1974 p 242.
112. V. N. Vinogradov, op. cit., p 63.
113. Ibidem, p 63.
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**. It should be stated that in some history works which appeared in Romania in the 60's and partially in the 70's, the thesis also was supported according to which Romania's participation in World War I was determined by annexationist goals, while Romania in 1918 was characterized as an "artificial" state created by the peace treaties of Paris in 1919-1920. In very many cases the "arguments" of these old and unscientific works are being taken over and used by some modern authors.

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GRBIC ASKS WHY LAWS NOT OBEYED

Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian 12 Sep 81 SEDAM DANA Supplement p 6

[Interview with Cedo Grbic, president of the Constitutional Court of Croatia, by Vlado Rajic: "The System Needs To Be Reexamined"; date and place not specified]

[Text] If the conclusion is valid that a large portion of the troubles we have are caused by the already proverbial lawbreaking, then it is strange that it should be so difficult to answer the question: Who is it who is not obeying the law? Following the step of logic and being careful not to generalize, it follows that "some people" are not abiding by laws. Who are these "some" (that is, not all) who by ignoring the law are causing troubles for the entire community? And, if these "some" constitute a minority, then why are there so many problems because of a minority?

Self-management acts, self-management accords and social compacts, the resolutions of party congresses, meetings of self-managers and worker caucuses, and the decisions of workers' councils ... these are a step further than laws (if the latter are regarded as a part of the mechanism of government coercion). These self-management statutes, if we can call them that, did not come about as a consequence of the functioning of the government apparatus, but are presumably an expression of the will, the interests and the commitments of those who drafted those standards. But we are not abiding by them either?

We talked with Cedo Grbic, president of the Constitutional Court of Croatia, about these two dilemmas.

[Question] I am taking the first question from numerous resolutions and guidelines we have adopted: Why is there such a gap between what has been put down on paper and reality, between the legal norms or those of self-management and their implementation?

[Answer] I would issue an immediate caution, we do have laws and legally binding measures which are in force, especially in the field of economic policy. For instance, enforcement of regulations and the measures set forth which burden the income of organizations of associated labor, norms which fix contributions, taxes and similar payments, is especially effective. On a broader basis than that, collections which the banks make on the basis of credit arrangements with business are also effective. Consequently, there are two different situations

in which we should examine and evaluate enforcement of norms. The first is that which is stated, and the other situation is the one in which there is no effectiveness. Concerning this latter we should be mindful of the fact that every norm, aside from setting forth and regulating a constructive social relationship, is oriented toward solutions which alter particular socioeconomic relations. This is where the gap between the norm and actual practice is most obvious, especially with respect to fulfillment of the requirements of the constitution and the Law on Associated Labor concerning the realization and distribution of income on the basis of joint income. It is with this idea that the credit relations and the banking system are to be superseded and the influence of the working class on expanded reproduction established. But the opposite has happened: The economy's share in financing expanded reproduction dropped from 40 percent in 1966 to only 35 percent in the last medium-term planning period. It is for that reason that the forms of linkage and pooling are making slow progress, and it is also evidenced in the fact that joint revenues represent only 9 percent of gross income, and the share of joint income is only 0.2 percent of total income.

Forces Offering Resistance

[Question] Do you say that about the centers of alienated power, as we like to call them, which have been mentioned so many times, or about a concrete distribution of forces in society in which certain people are responsible for making decisions and others for carrying them out?

[Answer] Call it what you like, the fact still remains that the old socioeconomic relations are stronger than many of the arrangements set forth in the constitution and the Law on Associated Labor, that they stand in opposition to establishment of the relations which they have proclaimed. We thus come to a real topic for reflection: Has this principle proclaimed in the constitution and the Law on Associated Labor been well stated, with accuracy and precision? Does it not leave some ambiguity, an empty space which is then filled by those who are better suited by the old system? It is obvious that the system needs to be re-examined; by the way, why shouldn't it be, we are a developing society. In so doing we should make a distinction and we should accept and build on what we have already implemented, for example, the conception of the organization of associated labor which has by and large been implemented, and we should insist on a change of relations in those processes which have not yet even begun.

[Question] It is a well-known case of thesis [and antithesis]. On the one hand there is the assertion that we have a "good system which should be implemented," and in response the other assertion: "a system is not good when for such a long time it is not implemented."

[Answer] In my opinion there is no dilemma about whether the system is good or bad. Posing that dilemma needs clarification. The essential thing is whether some institution that has been sketched out is inapplicable because it has not been realistically examined in particular social relations or, on the other hand, because the problem lies in the socioeconomic relations and the forces that operate through them. The problem, then, lies in the forces which resist every change which takes away their power and in the excessively slow

construction of the system, both of which, parallel to one another, are frustrating implementation of the institutions of self-management as they have been outlined.

[Question] The thesis that construction of the system needs to be completed is something that can be debated. After all, completion of construction of the system is something that can be accomplished only if there is a different lineup of those forces you speak about. Shouldn't we first of all change that balance of power? What I mean is this: If we take the resistance offered by power centers as the reality, and nonimplementation of norms as its parallel, then we end up with a closed circle. These forces are at the moment, you say, stronger than the constitution and the Law on Associated Labor, and the constitution and the Law on Associated Labor ought to be supplemented so that those forces are not so strong.

[Answer] It is true that that parallel does exist in our system, the simultaneous showdown with the old and construction of the new, will not be successful so long as the status of the workers and their influence are blocked along many lines. We all know that the decisions about certain essential issues of this society are made outside the working class, and there is no need to reiterate that one essential issue, the realization and distribution of income, is not in the hands of the workers. This then would be the main reason why so many things bypass the system, and it is feared that the gap between the constitution and practice is greatest.

Protection of Self-Management

[Question] There are many opponents who frequent amendment of the constitution. Opponents, that is, of that process which we have long ago adopted as the way to complete construction of the system. For those who do not think that amending the constitution is a sign of weakness the real question is this: If we spend so much time putting finishing touches on the constitution, why is it that we do not read it?

[Answer] Here again you are right, since we all swear by the constitution, even those who are openly working against it. Of course, no one is going to say in public that he is against the constitution; he would then get caught in the cross winds of commitments, and he would be risking the power which he possesses today. It is therefore better to hide behind the proclamation, and behind it work on the creation of self-management and to determine how much self-management the working class can get. So long as our commitments to principle and provisions pile up, so long as declarations are more important to us than their implementation, our self-management will be optional, rigged and measured out in doses. This is made possible by the fundamental provisions of the constitution which are not being adequately implemented and are not being added to by practice. If lengthy application and insistence on addition to the provisions of the constitution do not alter relations, then the constitution ought to be changed.

[Question] You mentioned awhile ago decisionmaking, referring to it as a form without content. Does it seem to you that the entire matter of evading laws and

other regulations, even self-management norms, lies in the simple fact that decisionmaking is precisely a form without content? And, if that is the case, what is it that obliges me to abide by norms, decisions and declarations? Because there are so many of them?

[Answer] There is criticism in numerous quarters to the effect that we have too many regulations, too many laws, and especially too many economic policy measures which strike deep into business life. What I would call this sort of trust in the government, this confidence in the reach of government norms, is indicative of a weakness of self-management, of the insufficient strength of self-management institutions, which by virtue of their own strength ought to be regulating social and economic relations. And when we already have so many government measures, then we ought to speak about elements of state socialism in our country. And that calls for changes in the system, changes that I would think of in terms of a mechanism to protect self-management. The purpose of that mechanism would be to prevent the government from intervening without very good reason in the relations of self-management and other relations.

[Question] If what you say is so, then all this time we have been building a dual system, self-management as an exhibit, and the government for specific business.

[Answer] It seems to me that even we have not been bypassed by the influence of what is an almost worldwide process of stronger government. All systems are going toward government regulation when new relations lack internal strength. And the relations in society are increasingly complex, so that strengthening of the government is becoming an objective fact. This is the case even in our country, and we should reject the illusion that the state will soon wither away. It is our great ambition to establish the socialist relations of self-management, whose strength must replace the role of the government. For this to happen social contradictions need to be resolved through self-management, and not with the help of the government. And that is the thing that is out of tune in our system. Contradictions exist, we feel them, and we often react in such a way that by uncontrolled pressure we demand rapid rescue measures and laws. All those urgent measures, and during the time of stabilization we have had a great many of them, do not demonstrate the effectiveness of the system, but rather its weakness. And every time there is criticism to the effect that laws are being enacted slowly, those people emerge who favor government intervention. Do I have to cite examples of the laws which we have adopted in haste, and then 3 days later they prove to be bad ones. And then in their haste the delegates are in a situation where they just raise their hands and pass a law or some measure. Here again there is neither self-management, nor the delegate system, nor ultimately even enforcement of the regulations.

Who Is the Government?

[Question] You are always speaking about the state, the government. Who is the government? That is, when we say the government, isn't there something else hiding behind that. The struggle for power, for example?

[Answer] I think that that is not the essence. Just look at how many declarations we have from party, self-management, trade union and all other gatherings. Let us look at how all these gatherings abide by the basic commitments of the constitution and laws in their declarations. But why do we not implement the resolutions of those gatherings? Obviously, declarative support alone is not sufficient for implementing the propositions of the constitution. Something concrete is needed, needed, moreover, in two directions. First, those things that are no good, which hold back and interfere, those things that should be changed and supplemented. Second, ideological action, above all by the League of Communists, must be more concrete, more precise; it must not consist of mere repetition of commitments and nothing more than that. That is why the work of primary organizations of the party, the trade unions and other sociopolitical organizations is swamped in generality.

[Question] Now that we have "dropped down" to the base, let us also discuss the plans of OOUR's [basic organization of associated labor] for a moment. Aren't these plans a matter of the commitment of the workers on behalf of their progress, their development, and so on. Yet even these plans, even though they stand as a law governing behavior, establish guidelines, and so on, remain only words on paper?

[Answer] I do not think that a plan is a law. As soon as one says that, then the conception is already the conception of state socialism. The plan ought to be a social compact concerning development, a self-management decision of all those involved in the plan (but this we have not achieved). Today our plans are a mixture of the desires of the self-managers and the government with respect to future development. It is our obligation to build the system of self-management planning as soon as possible, and that system presupposes strictness in fulfillment.

[Question] We have not understood one another. When I said that the plan ought to be a law, I was thinking of our custom of frequently debating a decision, even after it has been adopted, while up to that point we behave toward that same decision as someone else's job. What I mean is that we have therefore altogether forgotten work discipline. That is why nonfulfillment of plans is a consequence of formal decisionmaking and informal implementation.

[Answer] Today's plans, I agree, are so much a matter of principle and generalities that they do not convey a sense of having to be fulfilled. Who has ever been called to account for failure to fulfill the plan? But the essential question is how to arrive at a self-management plan?

[Question] As you have said, the way it is people in working organizations can have a clear conscience, even when they have not fulfilled the plan.

[Answer] The adoption of plans is not exclusively the concern of the workers, at least not at present, nor do the workers always know what the plan is all about. It would be another matter if the workers had occasion to consciously participate in drafting them, if the specialized staff services did not create the policy, but only assured the conditions for better information, for substantiating particular proposals, and alternatives.

The Pattern of Behavior of State Socialism

[Question] The worker is not incompetent (if one can speak at all about incapacity) so that he cannot make decisions on his own. The public debate of the Social Compact on Income, for example, "dredged up" about 2,000 proposals, suggestions, points of criticism and amendments for the proposed compact. And in a meeting of the commission which was working on it I heard the objection that very, very few of those suggestions were honored.

[Answer] That is, of course, an incomprehensible procedure. As for public debates about a new legislative bill, I know that the procedure is the opposite of the one in your example. Even the poor and tendentious proposals have to be examined, since they also are indicative of the field which the law is supposed to regulate.

[Question] Let me just clarify; objections are often made to the effect that public debates are lukewarm, and the attitude toward the suggestions of workers and individuals in previous debates is forgotten. So if a man is ignored in the public debate, then he will also ignore the "product" of that debate.

[Answer] Here we are talking about outright usurpation of small groups, of a breakdown of the delegate system, of getting around the laws, etc.

[Question] Let us go back up a little from the base. This summer the delegate system was "on vacation," and the administration was minding the store. Is there room for the judgment that the emergency measures that were adopted this summer might have been enacted even earlier in the debate with the delegate assemblies, since the things they were supposed to influence did not spring up yesterday?

[Answer] That issue of the so-called emergency measures is in any case a very important one. Our administrative agencies are too little concerned with the problems of implementing policy, which is their principal job and the one for which they bear greatest responsibility. And the harsher the public demand that they do so, the more they turn toward the problem of development policy and its formulation. That, of course, is not their job. Here we see the influence of state socialism, which I have already discussed. However, the problem of enforcing the laws, of implementing the postulates of the system, and so on, is also a matter of the activity of sociopolitical organizations and communities, which are also too little concerned with this. If the approach were different, then there would be no need for us to talk about nonenforcement of laws, self-management legislation, the resolutions of political gatherings, and so on; at any particular moment we would know what is not working and should be changed and which things should be persisted in.

Enforcement of laws, accords and compacts, resolutions and proclamations, to be sure, is a matter of the conscience of every individual, but sincerely this is also everyone's job duty, from the basic organization of associated labor to the government administration.

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SERBIAN SELF-MANAGEMENT DEFENDER INTERVIEWED

Belgrade ZUM REPORTER in Serbo-Croatian No 787, 30 Jul 81 pp 20-23

[Interview with Milovan Dinic, public defender of self-management law in the Republic of Serbia, by Branko Vukovic in Belgrade: "Thieves With a Cover"; date not specified]

[Text] "Not long ago a university professor from here in Belgrade came in. His school at the university was refusing to put him on the waiting list for allocation of apartments, and the professor was seeking my intervention. But they had not put him on the list because until recently he had an apartment. In the meantime he has been divorced and wants a new apartment.... The school has already drawn up its waiting list, but this fellow did everything for them to put him on the list immediately, to treat him not as an individual with an apartment, but as someone without housing. And it is only logical that I had to tell him: 'You know what, it is your right to get divorced and remarried, but a certain time has to pass for that altered situation, and then you can apply for a new apartment.' The professor, of course, went away mad."

This conversation with the impatient professor was only one of many similar conversations which Milovan Dinic, republic public defender of self-management law, has every day. A variety of people in distress knock on the door of his office, people who have knocked on many doors in their quest for justice. And they all expect that it is Milovan Dinic that will resolve "their case" once and for all.

There are thousands of such "cases." As a rule they are very complicated, so that it is by no means easy to "cut through" the matter and find a fair solution. After all, people can develop very bad blood, especially when their personal interest is at stake. Thus many of these cases can easily be put under the heading "Believe it or not."

Why the Public Defender of Self-Management Law Exists

It is the task of the public defender of self-management law to protect the self-management rights of the workers and social property. His job is a responsible one and by no means easy.... This institution of ours is a relatively young one, and there has been quite a bit of misunderstanding and resistance, especially at the outset. Certain responsible comrades were not enthusiastic about the idea of having alongside them an official entity that would be "ferreting about," presenting embarrassing matters and "making problems...." You

know, no one wants to be constantly monitored in his work, to have someone examine his acts, and moreover take steps against him as well.

[Question] It is said that you have rather broad powers?

[Answer] There has been talk about that recently, when we were preparing amendments of the federal constitution and the constitutions of the republics and provinces. There have been attempts, isolated ones to be sure, to have certain arrangements reevaluated. Along the line of whether excessive powers had not been granted to public defenders of self-management law, whether they hadn't been set up as a power outside our system, and so on. The judgment is that these objections are not valid, that there is no need to amend the provisions of the constitution on the public defender of self-management law.

[Question] Your interventions are more of a political nature than legal?

[Answer] The steps which we take are free of the usual formalities. When we spot some irregularity, we first give notice, we go to the organization of associated labor for a talk, we give advice on solving the problem that has arisen. There is no danger that we are usurping someone's rights in this, since we have no power to impose penalties. For example, we cannot go to the OUR [organization of associated labor] and say: "Comrades, you were wrong when you allocated that apartment to Marko, you have to make a decision to allocate the apartment to Janko, and we are penalizing you so much and so much." The public defender of self-management law does not have that power. But he can advise the OUR that its workers are appealing to him frequently and that it should be more mindful of this. He can point out that the regulation and distribution is not in conformity with the law and that it should be amended and supplemented, and so on.

Which means that we first take steps to resolve the matter within the OUR, we join with comrades from the OUR in seeking solutions, and only when we fail in this do we use legal means. By contrast with us, law enforcement agencies or the courts, for instance, are unable to say: "Comrades, your worker Petar Petrovic has stolen so much and so much, ask him to return the money...." I have simplified it a bit, but these are certain specific features of the activity of the public defender of self-management law.

Now You See Him, Now You Don't!

[Question] You have been active for 7 years now. Can it be said that you have fully established yourself as an institution?

[Answer] At the beginning many people did not even know about it. Even certain of the high officials asked me: "What is this public defender of self-management law, what is it you really do?" Some people were unable to remember the title....

Today matters are different. Most people know what the public defender of self-management law does, how and how much he can help. At the beginning of last year the Federal Assembly also issued a favorable assessment of our work. And then, as far as I know, there is not a single opstina assembly which has

complained about the work of the public defender of self-management law. But it is not my job to evaluate whether and to what extent public defenders of self-management law have established themselves. We recently wrote a report on our work, which will be examined in the fall by the Serbian Assembly. That will give the best insight into what and how much the public defenders of self-management law have achieved.

[Question] You have been fairly self-critical in that report?

[Answer] That is to be expected. Not all public defenders of self-management law have had the same performance. As everywhere, we also have those with good performance and those with poor performance. That is why we openly said in that report that there had been oversights, that we had not all been equally committed to protecting self-management rights and social property. The great majority of public defenders of self-management law have been and are performing their function conscientiously--especially in Belgrade and certain other towns--but there have also been some who have simply spent a certain time in the job--without any noticeable results.

[Question] In some opstinas there has not been a public defender of self-management law even after 7 years?!

[Answer] Yes, unfortunately, some have still not appointed a public defender of self-management law. These are the opstinas of Knic, Cicevac and Rekovac. In Golubac and Sjenica they did so only at the beginning of this year. I therefore put a frank question: Who gives those opstinas the right not to have a public defender of self-management law even when 7 years have passed since this institution was created by the constitution?

However, there is a greater problem. There are a number of opstinas where the public defender of self-management law has left his position, has been dismissed, has been assigned to other work, and a new person has been appointed to replace him. In other words, as the saying goes, now you see him, now you don't! Raca Kragujevacka, for instance, has not had a public defender of self-management law for 4 years now. In Krusevac the public defender of self-management law retired all of a year ago, a bit embittered after an awkward article about his personal income, and a new public defender of self-management law has not been appointed to replace him. The public defender of self-management law from Trstenik was appointed my deputy more than a year ago, and there is none there. In Varvarin they named the public prosecutor public defender of self-management law, so that in effect they did away with the post of public defender of self-management law. Recently this has also been done in Batocina: after the key official for the economy was arrested, they immediately appointed the public defender of self-management law to his position, but that left them without the public defender. We therefore are inclined to ask: what is the situation of those workers who until yesterday had a public defender of self-management law, but today do not?

Let us be clear: I am not against public defenders of self-management law moving to new positions even before the end of their term of office. But what I cannot understand in this personnel policy of ours, is that a new individual is

not "produced by the personnel system," if I can put it that way, to fill that vacancy. That is impermissible!

They Are Glad To Leave

[Question] Those who left were not very sorry to go?

[Answer] Unfortunately, a sizable portion could hardly wait to leave that position. And when you talk to them about this, all of them emphasize difficulties and numerous problems in their work. Beginning with the fact that this is a relatively new job, inadequately defined and practiced, and beyond that we are still building up the method of our activity, and going all the way to pressures and lack of understanding on the part of various official structures.

One of the first of the public defenders of self-management law, who took up this position enthusiastically, told me later when he was assigned to the post of director of the Social Accounting Service: "I am glad to go, since there I have a staff, I have staff service, I have people who do their job, and I am not directly responsible for anything. Here I am alone, as a practical matter I have no one to work with." Another public defender of self-management law has told me: "I am in a position here to turn people against me more and more, and I don't know how I will get along afterwards. I am not afraid, now, but when my term of office is over.... It is therefore better to leave when a good chance offers itself."

[Question] Which means that something must be changed in personnel policy?

[Answer] That is clear, since this personnel turnover is not good. I am especially against any promotion to a better job when he has not produced at all in this position. Though it turns out that this was some kind of place created for him, a place to bide his time awhile and wait for better days. One public defender of self-management law spent 3 years in the post in that way, and we do not know of a single case he followed through on. After that he left for a higher position! Another left the position of public defender of self-management law to take an important high administrative post in the region, and only when the new public defender of self-management law came in did we establish that there was no documentation whatsoever on the work of his predecessor during the previous 3 years! So we see that he took it easy, prepared for his master's degree and waited for his moment.... These are, of course, exceptions. There are far more public defenders of self-management law who have affirmed themselves, who have gained a reputation and who have gone to better positions.

[Question] Have some been replaced?

[Answer] Over the last 2 years 30 percent of the public defenders of self-management law have left before the end of their term of office. Only one was dismissed against his will, the others left to fill vacancies.

Two Public Defenders of Self-Management Law--Two Opinions

[Question] A moment ago you mentioned pressures on public defenders of self-management law. Who is exerting these pressures, and why?

[Answer] The pressures come mainly from failure to understand the nature of this post. When the public defender of self-management law was established, the principal idea was actually for it to be an independent public entity. It therefore was strongly emphasized in both the constitution and in law that the public defender of self-management law was an independent body of the social community....

[Question] And not a body of the opstina....

[Answer] ... And not a body of the particular opstina and so on. However, in practice this has sometimes not been the case. For example, in some places people have understood from the fact that the opstina assembly appoints the public defender of self-management law and furnishes the funds for his work, that he is a body of that opstina, and not a body of the social community as a whole. The public defender of self-management law is therefore called upon to act solely from the positions of that opstina, to neglect the general public interest. If public defenders of self-management law give in to that pressure, then we have an absurd situation: two public defenders of self-management law have diametrically opposed views on the same issue! But that is unacceptable from the standpoint of our overall function.

When the campaign was waged for certain components to withdraw from the Beograd Agricultural Combine, we found ourselves in an unpleasant situation. The public defender of self-management law and his deputy in Vrsac argued persistently that components of the Beograd Agricultural Combine in that opstina should withdraw from the SOUR [complex organization of associated labor]. The public defenders of self-management law in Belgrade followed an altogether different line of argument: that there was no real need for that withdrawal, that this amounted to enclosure within opstina boundaries, and so on.

[Question] What other ways are pressures put on the public defenders of self-management law?

[Answer] There are a multitude of forms. For instance, in cases of what is referred to as gainful misappropriation of funds, pressure is exerted on the public defender of self-management law not to take steps, because this was "good for the organization," it "increased its income," "this man put nothing in his own pocket," and the like. Or the president of the opstina will telephone the public defender of self-management law: "Listen, buddy, why are you getting after that organization of associated labor, don't you know that's where we get our living?"

[Question] And when personnel, individuals, are involved?

[Answer] Then pressure is exerted on the public defender of self-management law not to "spoil" certain juggling of personnel involving particular individuals....

Recently we had a flagrant example in Belgrade. In one Belgrade opstina an official's term of office had expired, and his friends in the opstina planned for him the post of assistant director in a large work organization. However, the public defender of self-management law found that such a job slot had not been envisaged in the bylaws, and he opposed the appointment of that official. Well, the entire political elite of the opstina immediately called him in for a talk, where the public defender of self-management law was sharply criticized. They tried to "convince" him to change his opinion. Fortunately, the public defender of self-management law had the courage to resist the pressure resolutely, he did not give in.... They had to look for another job for that official, who had already been appointed to the position of assistant director.

"He Makes the Workers Restless"

[Question] Public defenders of self-management law frequently disturb "wasp nests," they get into confrontations with influential people. What are the consequences?

[Answer] It is not just a question of "wasp nests." It is more a question of powerful individuals occupying positions. By contrast with us, for example, the court is dealing with a person against whom proceedings have been instituted and charges filed. The prosecutor has in front of him a man who has been indicted, and so on. We are dealing with people in associated labor who occupy high positions in the organization of associated labor, the self-managing community of interest, or the sociopolitical community. And here, whether we file charges or want to learn something on our own initiative, it is not easy at all. These people, these influential individuals, are often very perfidious and subtle when they need to obstruct the public defender of self-management law. They try to discredit him publicly, they use misinformation and slander, they pin labels on the public defender of self-management law and accuse him of "making the workers restless," of "protecting slackers," and the like.

I will give you an example of the former director of the Hotel and Restaurant College in Belgrade. This man developed a whole system of misinformation about the public defender of self-management law. It is amazing the strings this man pulled to prevent intervention of the university committee, and it was a question how the public defender of self-management law would ultimately fare.

A fresh example of that of the director of one of the OOUR's [basic organization of associated labor] in the cement factory in Paracin. This man also fabricated a wealth of lies, instituted a campaign, wrote letters everywhere....

We devote particular attention to this form of resistance and attack on public defenders of self-management law. We try to suppress them, though it is not easy. It is important to emphasize that this resistance is not waged by workers, but precisely by those against whose behavior the public defenders of self-management law are taking steps. They want to frustrate the public defender of self-management law, to prevent him from raising "hot topics," they want to divert him onto petty issues of no importance. Insofar as the public defender of self-management is concerned with these key and more difficult problems, then, to that extent he is exposed to a greater danger and greater risks....

Who Is Protecting the Slackers

[Question] What is the most frequent reason for workers to appeal to the public defender of self-management law?

[Answer] Over the last 3 years we have intervened most frequently because of violations of rights arising out of the employment relation (hiring and termination of employment, work assignment, pronouncement of disciplinary measures, etc.). Then come problems in the housing field, which are becoming more and more common. In third place are matters related to distribution of personal incomes.

[Question] Are there frequent cases of efforts to get rid of workers who speak openly and critically?

[Answer] There are, of course, such cases. Sometimes a person who has spoken critically about the problems in distribution of income is assigned to a poorer job or receives a disciplinary penalty. Sometimes the entire management structure plots against the worker, and this is difficult to stop and to protect the person. I am surprised that even his trade union organization usually will not come to his defense. Not to mention the legal service!

[Question] What view do they take in the workplace toward workers who appeal to the public defender of self-management law?

[Answer] They do not look on him with sympathy! They usually say: "You didn't have to go there, we could have resolved this among ourselves." Many workers say in their criticism that they have been persecuted, abused and punished because they sought our help. This is a disturbing phenomenon.

[Question] You are accused of protecting slackers. Recently we read in the papers a statement by a director to the effect that there was no point in trying to get rid of slackers, since the public defender of self-management law and the courts would reinstate him.

[Answer] I do not believe that is the case. It is not true that the law, the courts and public defenders of self-management law are protecting slackers. However, it is true that there are quite a few slackers who escape responsibility. Why? Usually for formal reasons. But since there is no content without form, we demand that the prescribed procedure be followed in the taking of steps. A person cannot be fired without getting a hearing. Proceedings must be conducted, evidence must be presented and the facts established. And then when the decision is made in the first instance, he must be allowed to appeal. I am in favor of speeding up this procedure, but I don't agree that it favors slackers.

Habitual Litigants

[Question] You also receive requests from people for whom nothing is ever right, for whom everyone is to blame and dishonest. How do you deal with them?

[Answer] Nearly 20 percent of the applications are unfounded. Then the public defender of self-management law does not intervene. I think that this is not a disturbing percentage, since it would be quite a situation if everyone who complained was right. Then our society would be a society of lawlessness.

These unfounded petitions indicate that we are also dealing with slackers, with people who see only their own rights, but not their obligations, with habitual litigants. Some people indeed want to wangle something in a way that is unlawful and contrary to self-management, using impermissible means and methods. This is typical in resolving housing issues and then with unjustified sick leave and the like.

You have people who have complained to everyone all along the line and everywhere they have lost. And now he thinks that the public defender of self-management law is the one who can resolve the matter on his own--regardless of the decision of the court, regardless of the decision of the self-management body, regardless of the decision of the agency of the sociopolitical community. And when you explain to him that what he is doing makes no sense at all, he still does not lose heart: "I will go elsewhere, I will complain even about you!" What are we to do, go ahead and complain! Even public defenders of self-management law are not infallible....

[Question] Do you sometimes manage to convince them?

[Answer] There was a man named Jovanovic from Vranje who listened to me. For 6 years he had a dispute with the cotton combine. He went to the federal public prosecutor, and even there he did not win support. Then he came to me. We talked as one comrade to another. I told him: "Give it up, man, calm down, there are no grounds for intervention." He listened to me and gave it up. I have heard that he is doing good work now.

There is one man I am trying to convince right now. He has married twice, twice he has obtained an apartment. Now he has married again, again he wants a new apartment. His reasoning is this: "A new wife--a new apartment!"

[Question] One gets the impression that not a single apartment can be allocated without intervention from the court and the public defender of self-management law.

[Answer] There are a great many of these disputes. And the problems which arise in this area are numerous. There are few apartments, there are many more applicants. Often the apartments are allocated under the influence of individuals or groups. In some places apartments are allocated, but self-management acts have not been adopted at all. There are many errors, oversights and abuses by those seeking apartments. It is not a rare thing for a father to give his apartment to his son and then to apply for a job as a person who does not have an apartment. Family households are fictitiously divided up, there are divorces, and so on. All this results in a large number of disputes and intervention by the courts and the public defenders of self-management law.

The Limits of Avarice

[Question] Recently flagrant attacks on social property have become more frequent. The scandals in Beograd Engineering, the Rakovica Opstina Assembly, and certain self-managing communities of interest.... How do you explain that?

[Answer] Social property, especially in certain spheres, is seriously threatened. The mechanism for protecting social property is not functioning well. We therefore constantly have cases of very bold attacks on social property. You mentioned the self-managing communities of interest. I honestly cannot give you a single example where workers' control in some self-managing community of interest has taken measures or has made a name for itself in protecting social property. But it is here that there is the greatest illegality and the largest number of "cases."

[Question] The delegate system seems not to be functioning at all in this area?

[Answer] Enormous assets of society are concentrated in the self-managing communities of interest, and the secretaries and staff services have the decisive role in spending them. Their behavior, the quality of their work, the size of the staff, and so on, indicate that the self-managing communities of interest are becoming more and more alienated centers of power over which the workers cannot exert an influence. Nevertheless, the establishment of new self-managing communities of interest is being proposed, though there is no real need for them.

[Question] We asked you ...

[Answer] Yes, yes ... Beograd Engineering, Rakovica.... I can cite you a number of other examples of losses to social property and of enrichment without work. Public defenders of self-management law have done quite a bit here, they have made a name for themselves in specific examples and have resolutely stood in the way of abuses. To be sure, we have not always wanted to get press coverage, but there are a number of examples when the public defenders of self-management law have been the first to rise up.... That was the case in Vrnjacka Banja, Sokobanja, Smederevo, Cukarica, Rakovica, Krusevac and elsewhere. It is a question of abuses in the allocation of lots and credits for housing construction.

We advocated, for example, that the lots and credits be allotted in a self-management way, through competitions and under equal conditions for everyone. We were also resolutely opposed to the expropriation of the property of private persons, and then allocating that same land to individuals to build on after 2 or 3 years.

How do I explain these cases? The mechanism which is supposed to protect social property is often absent. Second, people have a weakened sense of responsibility when there are no penalties. I often wonder at the degree to which some people become avaricious and insatiable. What does it mean when someone obtains a lot in the center of the city for a song, without a competition, under the

most favorable conditions? Kragujevac is unfortunately just one example here, not the only one.

Everything Is "According to the Law"

[Question] Not infrequently the scoundrels you speak about take pains to put things in a legal form.

[Answer] Of course, since no one is any longer so naive as to undertake outright theft. They seek a cover in the decisions of the legal authorities, so that at first it seems that everything is "according to the law," but flagrant losses are nevertheless inflicted on social property.

[Question] Some time ago the issue of embezzlement in the former Association of Journalists was raised once again, rather timidly to be sure. It seemed as though everything would be covered up.

[Answer] That was a case in which social property was passed out with both hands. I have something to say about this in a meeting, but the press did not carry it in its entirety, and it dropped.... I do not share the opinion that investigatory agencies and the court work slowly, since this is truly an enormous job. We are dealing with several hundred names and I therefore do not have the impression that they are trying to cover anything up. In fact, I did not speak about that, but I took the position that these matters must be dealt with by administrative agencies responsible for income as well. That is, did he declare that income or not? If one and the same person turns up as the recipient of a high fee of the Association of Journalists, in the Business College, in some other college in Rijeka, that is, at several places, then that person must pay nearly 70 percent of his earnings in taxes. So, if he has regularly reported all that and honestly paid his tax.... In fact, I am critical of the staff of the administration for income because it only assesses the tax, but it does not run a check on how much tax I as an individual have declared. And that will be especially important now when we are discontinuing these commissions for investigation of the origin of property.

Self-Managing Bodies Are Violating Self-Management

[Question] According to certain figures, violations of the self-management rights of the workers and social property are committed most frequently by the bodies of self-management, i.e., by bodies which the workers have elected themselves. Isn't this absurd?

[Answer] I will give you precise figures on who is infringing on the self-management rights of the workers. We have found that of the total number of violations' of workers' rights last year about 23 percent were committed by workers' councils. Then about 22 percent by commissions and committees. Nearly 11 percent of the violations were committed by directors, more than 8 percent were made by other supervisory personnel, and violations were committed in 5.7 percent of the cases by worker caucuses.

In analyzing this phenomenon we came to the conclusion that the specialized services and key supervisors often offer unlawful arrangements to the bodies of self-management, and the latter simply adopt them. In other words, they are being deceived in a way. In addition, we have also detected cases of threats, pressures and manipulation of the bodies of self-management. That is why defenders of self-management law insists that these people be called to account. And that means all of them--members of the workers' council and commissions, directors and other supervisors. After all, we cannot allow our behavior to be governed by the well-known adage: "Tie up the horse where the aga tells you." No one is entitled to the excuse that he did not know or anything of that kind.

[Question] Can you illustrate with specific cases?

[Answer] Here is a drastic case. It occurred in one OOUR in the cement plant in Popovac. Thanks to the good situation on the market that plant today has no problems whatsoever in operation of its business. Well, though they do not have a regulation on innovations, the workers' council of that OOUR adopted a decision to pay the director 108 million old dinars on behalf of innovations. Of course, the public defender of self-management law had that decision struck down in the court, since it was unlawful. And what happened? The workers' council does not acknowledge its error. It does not agree that such decisions may not be adopted without a general self-management act, but again meets and decides. This time--50 million! Then the bidding begins.... So, we will again have that evaluated. We will call upon the court to evaluate those 50 million as well and state whether it is alright or not.

The next example is also drastic. The director of a boarding school in Leskovac went off to obtain coal for heating. He rushed off to Bosnia, traveled by taxi, looked for it and found it. He justified his action by a decision of the council of the boarding school. What is more, he managed to buy the coal! Everything is alright, we said, but how about the way in which he did it? Does this mean that he might also have gone by airplane?! And now you have a conflict. On the one hand is the public defender of self-management law, who feels that this is an abuse and squandering of social resources. On the other side is the council of the boarding school, and its position is that if the director had not gone, they would be left without coal!

As I say, there are many examples. That is why we are constantly pointing to these cases and calling for a more responsible attitude. It is a question of responsibility. No one can seek cover behind the decisions of a collective body, everyone must bear personal responsibility. But that is what we lack today.

An OOUR With Three Workers!

[Question] Public defenders of self-management law are also pointing to group-ownership behavior.

[Answer] Not only the public defenders of self-management law, but we are all speaking about that frequently, we are adopting resolutions and positions, we are making evaluations, and so on. However, when it comes down to pointing

specifically to those who are behaving after the pattern of group ownership, here we are slack, here we water things down.

To be specific, we detect group-ownership behavior in certain scientific institutions when it comes to realizing and distributing income. In large institutions it is not uncommon for scientists not to divide up income at the level of the OOUR, but the income goes to certain teams, work units, and so on. So, if a certain team has done more work, if it has someone with stronger connections who brings it work, he earns more. The money is divided up within the team, within the work unit, and not at the level of the OOUR. We managed to put a stop to that practice in the Institute for Foreign Trade, but we have not entirely succeeded in the Institute for Chemistry and Technology. And in the latter, incidentally, they had an OOUR with three workers for a time!

To go on, as we see it, the cement factory in Popovac was an example of group-ownership behavior. Everyone is getting along fine, they are earning high personal incomes, and it is not unusual for them to reason: "Since we are all getting along fine, let's give our director 100 million or so for innovations"! And who has the right to interfere with their doing so, when that is theirs! Of course, when we describe this as group-ownership behavior then problems arise.

The Unpleasant Side of Self-Management

[Question] There has been reference to the flood of legal enactments--laws and general self-management acts. As if this is justice on paper....

[Answer] That problem does exist, and we confront it in a serious way. We have a sea of laws and self-management acts, we endeavor to regulate everything, to cover every situation in life with some norm. It makes it difficult even for a professional attorney to get his bearings, much less an ordinary man. It also opens up possibilities for abuse, and, what is important, it increases the size of the administration. We have precise figures on this.

In 1977, for example, in Serbia proper we had 851 work communities in associated labor. Two years later the number had increased to 1,164. Since work communities consist mainly of office workers, it is clear that we have a large growth of administration. In addition, the number of persons employed in these communities has been growing very rapidly. Often the work communities are poorly set up from the organizational standpoint, and their tasks have not been precisely set forth, their responsibility to the OOUR's has not been defined. It is therefore no wonder that the OOUR's are setting themselves apart and increasing their own administration, since they are dissatisfied with the quality of services from the work communities.

[Question] Every day you encounter various illegalities, abuses, and arbitrariness on the part of individuals and groups. Isn't there too much of this?

[Answer] It is our function to be concerned less with the sanguine side of life and more with the other side. It is true that the number of petitions and applications to public defenders of self-management law has been growing year after year. However, it would be a mistake--I always give this particular

emphasis--for us to conclude from this that there is less self-management, that everyone is violating the law and self-management acts. It is actually the opposite--this demonstrates that the working people have become far more critical toward the acts of individuals and institutions and that they are becoming more aware and freer in seeking protection of their rights. This in actuality means that the working people are increasingly ready to get involved in the struggle against those things that are hampering the development of self-management and democracy.

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CHARGES AGAINST MARKO VESELICA DISCUSSED

Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian 12 Sep 81 SEDAM DANA Supplement pp 17-18

[Article by Djordje Licina: "Counterarguments Without Evidence"]

[Text] "It is not I who is doing you harm, but the material which you gave me to carry across the border!" That is what Mila Sram, key witness for the prosecution, very calmly and resolutely said on the fourth day of the trial to Dr Marko Veselica, former university docent, thereby for all practical purposes completing the exposure of his hostile activity, thus proving what the prosecutor had long since asserted: that Marko Veselica, one of the principal ideologues and organizers of what has been referred to as the mass movement in 1971, has since his release from prison not only been engaged in hostile propaganda, but has even deliberately entered into relations with Ustasha terrorists abroad, giving them and receiving from them guidelines for activity against Yugoslavia.

The words of the witness--Veselica's secret messenger--pronounced during the confrontation of witnesses in the trial, that is, in front of a broad and diverse audience, were indisputably the most dramatic moment of the 7-day trial. They had the effect of a kind of psychological mallet which mercilessly crushed Veselica's very last hope that he would manage to prove the opposite. The last day of the trial also showed how fateful that woman's testimony was for the defendant: Veselica's concluding speech lasted more than 4.5 hours; in it he talked more about his well-known nationalistic theses, supporting them with various quotations, presumably so as to give the idea that there are also others who think like he does, and less about the allegations of the indictment, though there were reasons in plenty for the latter. He spoke about the witness Mila Sram less than 2 minutes. In order to completely discredit her testimony or because he simply did not have counterarguments against her assertions? It is obvious that the latter was involved, since the course of the trial has unambiguously shown that Veselica suspected that this secret channel of his to the fascist emigre community abroad might be discovered and cut off, so that at one moment--as the witness very convincingly reconstructed--he asked for his report to the Ustasha emigres not to be sent from Bratsk but from Berne, where Mila Sram had previously spent time on several occasions in performing a similar task.

Veselica's ties with the fascist terrorist organizations abroad is an altogether new detail (the president of the panel of criminal judges referred to it as a

new attribute) in his continuous hostile activity. In its hearing on the verdict in the first instance in 1972 (when he was sentenced to 7 years in prison) the Supreme Court of Croatia said that it had not been proven against Veselica, who operated from counterrevolutionary and nationalistic positions within the framework of the ideology of what was referred to as the mass movement, that he had established links with the fascist emigre community. Now, however, that new attribute has come to light, proving the assertion that this most recent case did not involve merely indirect contacts having to do with propaganda, but in fact a coincidence and identity of views and opinions and ideological ties.

Emigre Examples

That is, it is beyond dispute that Veselica had been heeding, following and analyzing the actions of the extremist emigre community, just as it is quite certain that that political underground had honored the defendant's opinions and positions. This incidentally is also indicated by certain reports which traveled to Veselica from abroad and from Veselica abroad. Via his messenger last October Veselica received from the well-known Ustasha emigre Tihomil Radja, who lives in Switzerland, the guidelines of a fascist organization under the code name "Jack London," according to which all documentation on persecution was to be delivered abroad, and that documentation was to be used as a provocative act in Madrid at the Conference of Security and Cooperation in Europe. According to those same guidelines of Radja's, Veselica was to send exhaustive data on the economic situation in the SFRY and the impact it was having on the Croatian economy. A directive also arrived from Berne in October calling for the accused and those holding the same political views to establish links and cooperation with the dissidents in Belgrade, with Djilas and others, in order to set in motion a campaign for amnesty of political prisoners.

Nor, however, was Veselica only on the receiving end: In a report sent to the Ustasha emigres Mirko Vidovic and Tihomil Radja he gives advice on what should be done and which task is urgent: "Attempt to organize groups of intellectuals and public figures of various countries ... to which letters of protest and appeals addressed to their own and our government for halting the persecution in Croatia could be sent for certification. As was the case a few days ago of the German newsmen and the intellectuals of the journal PRAXIS, who sent an open letter to the president of the Serbian Assembly. Unless all this together is done and world public opinion set in motion, there could be large-scale persecutions and consequences for the destiny of Croatia."

The conviction has been created in recent years in the hostile political emigre community that the "battle for an independent new Croatia" can be won only by forces within the country, and that the emigre community can merely offer its aid in this. We are well aware which forces those are. That is why it is altogether impossible to remain in doubt as to why this connection suddenly cropped up between Marko Veselica and fascist exponents abroad. In planning and carrying out its hostile activity, especially activity to sow distrust between Croats and Serbs, the fascist emigre community has sought and is constantly seeking the most outspoken proponents of this kind of nationalistic platform. In Veselica's interview with the West German newsmen Hans Joachim Bornemann they saw an exceptional occasion for warming over their malicious theses and for inciting ethnic

enmity. Though Veselica tried throughout the trial to convince the court of the supposed harmlessness of the political messages and the tolerance of the views expressed in that conversation, the interview is among other things a typical example of deliberate dissemination of intolerance and enmity toward other ethnic communities in Yugoslavia. It is indeed full of provocative messages and irritating insinuations, theses which are pronouncedly nationalistic, and it advocates indivisible national sovereignty, that is, pure ethnic exclusiveness. It also attempts to impose the conviction that the Croatian people in Yugoslavia is culturally subordinate, neglected and denied, while SR [Socialist Republic] Croatia is exposed to systematic and arrogant plundering by the other republics and provinces. "If, then, Montenegro is to be able to catch up with SR Croatia and the other advanced portions, it must exploit the Croatian economy to a horrifying extent, while at the same time it bears no sort of moral or economic motivation to conduct its economic activity efficiently," Marko Veselica says in one passage.

"Large-Scale Persecutions"

In his interview, which the Ustasha emigre community hastened to publish in certain of its periodicals (and Hans Peter Rullman, agent of a foreign intelligence service who 10 years ago was tried for espionage in Yugoslavia, followed their lead), Veselica did not actually say much that was new. He chewed over certain of his theses already exploited in the period of the so-called mass movement, embellishing them only with certain new "scientific discoveries and new knowledge." Including this among others, in which he alludes to the 21st Meeting of the LCY Presidium in Karadjordjevo: "But then the dark fell, the darkness known to everyone, out of which has sprung the brutal and large-scale persecution of innocent Croatian youth, intellectuals and the people, a persecution that leads nowhere.... Thus, though we who were tried in 1972 and 1973 are now out, and we were tried as alleged members of the mass movement and the counterrevolution, we are being followed by new groups of innocent people who have been convicted...."

What sort of "large-scale persecutions" are actually being referred to? Veselica's "information," however, is refuted by ordinary statistics: In 1979 117 persons were charged in SR Croatia (though not necessarily tried), all of 98 percent of them for minor political crimes (curses, insults, etc.). A year later 275 persons were charged and the percentage of those for minor political offenses was almost the same. In the first 6 months of this year only 32 persons have been charged, 11 of them for a serious form of political crime.

It is obvious, then, that through his thesis of alleged large-scale persecutions in Croatia Veselica is actually trying to launch the conviction which he scrupulously advocated in the major portion of his interview: That "the modern thing is to constantly maintain criticism of fascism concerning Croatia in order to halt the process of its democratic expansion and so as to nurture in a programmed way the feeling of its permanent guilt and frustration even when it is altogether innocent...."

It needs to be said, however, that Veselica is not the only nationalist who has persistently and systematically revived the imagined guilt complex in the

Croatian people. This has been done by others before him and after him. With always the same goal, to build upon it their chauvinistic program of revanchism.

In his interview with the West German newsmen Veselica gave answers typical of him to the difficulties with which our community is burdened, and his already well-known constant stood at the heart of all those answers: that the Croatian nation has been reduced to an oppressed class within the borders of Yugoslavia and that the Serbs are a privileged bureaucratic and ruling class. He therefore holds that the Croatian people is thereby menaced, and at one place in the interview he says: "Never will the beatings and persecutions which some Serbs are unjustifiably administering to Croats and other nationalities of Yugoslavia destroy the Croatian dream of greater freedom and achievement of full sovereignty of the Croatian people guaranteed it by the new constitution, but denied it by the actual power structure in which the Serbs have in Croatia an absolute domination which at present is not jeopardized nor controlled in any way...."

What is actually the purpose of sowing this kind of systematic suspicion toward another nationality in Croatia? Obviously not merely to set the two nationalities at odds, but also to establish a line of politics that would rehabilitate the darkest part of our recent past and would actually be aimed toward general disunification, which certain foreign appetites could hardly wait for.

It is also in that context that we should examine the motions of the defense in the evidentiary proceedings in which it called for an ethnic recount of persons employed in federal bodies, agencies and organizations, Yugoslavia's foreign diplomatic and consular missions, leadership bodies of opstina committees of the League of Communists, and also law enforcement agencies and the army. The nature of these demands by the defense does not at all coincide with the well-known demands made in the time of the so-called mass movement, which came down to "absolute personnel purity," which really is nothing other than an obvious harangue against other nationalities and ethnic minorities. We believe, however, that this demand was more a deliberate provocation than a sober move motivated by justice.

A Memory Block

What else did the trial just ended prove? Many objective observers were left entirely of two minds when they listened to the testimony of the witness Zora Heger, who had known Marko Veselica and Mila Sram and later had established a permanent link between them. They remained of two minds simply because this witness declared that she was not acquainted with Dr Marko Veselica at all. However, this testimony sounded absolutely unconvincing when certain documents proving the contrary were shown to Zora Heger: to the effect that she not only knew Marko Veselica, but was in fact his devoted collaborator. This emerges from the following material facts: When Zora Heger's apartment was searched, a photocopy of Veselica's interview with the newsmen of the West German magazine DER SPIEGEL was found in it. The witness testified at the trial that she had found the interview in her mailbox rolled up together with some other material. Zora Heger then began to copy the interview she had "found" on her typewriter. Why? She gave a rather laconic answer in the trial: for practice. The interview ultimately ended up in Heger's stove, which she did not use. It was found

hidden there together with a pile of other hostile propaganda material. She was unable to give a reasonable explanation as to what she used this material for. However, Mila Sram provided an altogether logical answer: "I received that material from Tihomil Radja and I was to deliver it to Veselica."

The trial showed that Zora Heger's apartment was the "mission headquarters" and the point of origin and destination of the illegal channel whereby Veselica maintained relations with the Ustasha extremists. This is also confirmed by the report entitled "Political Processes in Croatia" which Veselica sent by his messenger to the emigre Mirko Vidovic in Lyon. This report was written on an Erica typewriter owned by Zora Heger. In the trial, however, the witness declared that it was not clear to her how that was possible, since she, she said, did not type that report. Zora Heger was also unable to give a logical answer to the question of how a letter came to be found in her apartment which had been sent to Marko Veselica by the so-called European Helsinki group, a nongovernmental institution abroad which has been infiltrated by foreign intelligence services and of which Mirko Vidovic the Ustasha emigre is also a member. Nor could she remember what her motive was when she gave Mila Sram, on the eve of her last trip abroad, a message written in her own hand containing certain details about the criminal proceedings against Marko Veselica.

How is it that Zora Heger suddenly suffered this total memory block? The prosecutor explained this phenomenon in his conclusion in approximately these words: We know who Zora Heger is. She was tried immediately after the war for collaboration with bands of Crusaders [members of a Catholic clerical organization-- translator's note] and served sentence in the Criminal House of Correction in Slavenska Pozega, where she also came to know Mila Sram (sentenced to 4 years for illegal trade). This past of hers and her political conviction are the answer to the question of why she was protecting Dr Marko Veselica.

What did the trial also show? Among other things ... the untenability of Veselica's main line of defense that he is being tried because of his beliefs. In presenting the information contained in the interview, he said, he was exercising his legitimate right to free expression of thought and conviction. In so reasoning Veselica has obviously forgotten the nature of our legal statutes: No one can exercise that freedom and those rights to conduct hostile activity against the SFPY. And what Marko Veselica has said and done cannot be described otherwise than as a deliberate hostile act. Which is why the sentence of 11 years in prison (8 of them for establishing relations with the fascist emigre community) should be viewed as a logical answer to these "beliefs" of Veselica's, and especially to the supposed nonexistent tie between him and the Ustasha emigres abroad.

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